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Pharmaceutical Federalism* 
PATRICIA J. ZETTLER† 
There is growing interest in states regulating pharmaceuticals in ways that challenge 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) federal oversight. For example, in 
2013, Maine enacted a law to permit the importation of unapproved drugs, reflecting 
concerns that federal requirements are too restrictive, while in 2014 Massachusetts 
banned an FDA-approved painkiller, reflecting concerns that federal requirements 
are too lax. This Article provides an account of this recent state interest in regulating 
drugs and considers its consequences. It argues that these state regulatory efforts, 
and the nascent litigation about them, demonstrate that the preemptive reach of the 
FDA’s authority extends into medical practice regulation in some circumstances. It 
then begins to explore implications outside of the preemption context, arguing that 
state regulatory efforts may also help to inform our general understanding of both 
the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and the relationship between the FDA and the 
states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is facing a severe drug abuse epidemic. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that in 2015, drug overdoses resulted in over 
52,000 deaths, and overdoses have eclipsed motor vehicle crashes as the leading 
cause of injury-related death in the United States.1 Contrary to what may be popular 
conception, FDA-approved pharmaceuticals contribute to nearly half of all overdose 
deaths.2 And opioids (a powerful class of pain medications) are, by far, the pharma-
ceuticals involved in the most overdose deaths.3  
Against this backdrop, in October 2013, the FDA approved Zohydro™ ER 
(“Zohydro”), a new high-dose opioid that lacked abuse-deterrent properties.4 Shortly 
after the FDA approved Zohydro, politicians, physicians, and FDA advisory com-
mittee members openly questioned the agency’s decision, with one physician and 
medical school professor describing it as “a disaster in the making.”5 The Fed Up 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COORDINATING COMM., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT ACTIVITIES 
AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/hhs
_prescription_drug_abuse_report_09.2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5XY-U2JV]; Rose A. 
Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose 
Deaths—United States, 2000–2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr
/mm655051e1.htm [https://perma.cc/SD94-JH7E]. 
 2. Prescription Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html [https://perma.cc
/4WG8-AHUC]; see also Christopher M. Jones, Karin A. Mack & Leonard J. Paulozzi, Phar-
maceutical Overdose Deaths, United States, 2010, 309 JAMA 657, 657–59 (2013) (finding 
that, in 2010, 57.7% of drug overdose deaths involved FDA-approved pharmaceuticals). 
 3. See Rudd et al., supra note 1. It is worth noting that there are limitations to these 
findings, including that many overdose deaths involve the use of more than one drug, and there 
is variation in information about the causes of overdose deaths (or a lack of information). Id. 
But opioid misuse is, without question, a serious public health problem, and perhaps more 
importantly for this Article, politicians and the public clearly perceive opioid misuse to be of 
grave concern. See BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COORDINATING COMM., supra note 1, at 3; Roni 
Caryn Rabin, New Painkiller Rekindles Addiction Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014, 4:50 
PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/new-painkiller-rekindles-addiction-concerns
/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6UZ3-GLWP]. 
 4. Rabin, supra note 3. Various features are thought to make drugs abuse resistant. The 
most commonly discussed abuse-deterrent feature is designing pills to be resistant to crushing 
so that the drug cannot be snorted or injected for a quick, intense high. Id. 
 5. John Fauber & Kristina Fiore, FDA OKs High-Dose Narcotic Painkiller Zohydro, 
Raising Abuse Concerns, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.jsonline 
2017] PHARMACEUTICAL FEDERALISM  847 
 
Coalition, a drug addiction advocacy group, started a Change.org petition to pressure 
the FDA to withdraw Zohydro’s approval.6 And twenty-eight state attorneys general, 
from states across the political spectrum, wrote a letter to the FDA Commissioner 
asking that she reconsider the drug’s approval.7 
Once Zohydro’s manufacturer began to sell the drug in March 2014, concerns 
about the drug not only intensified, but also motivated state action.8 In a highly unu-
sual move, the governor of Massachusetts acted to prohibit the “prescribing and dis-
pensing” of Zohydro until it was reformulated to deter abuse—effectively banning 
an FDA-approved drug within the state’s borders.9 This prohibition, however, was 
                                                                                                                 
 
.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/fda-oks-high-dose-narcotic-painkiller-zohydro-raising-abuse 
-concerns-b99128369z1-229484621.html [https://perma.cc/5Z6Q-DZ7W]. 
 6. Fed Up Coal., Reconsider Approval of Dangerous New Opioid Zohydro, 
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/reconsider-approval-of-dangerous-new-opioid-zohydro 
[https://perma.cc/2KT5-J5XP]. 
 7. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys. Gen. to Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin. (Dec. 10, 2013), https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20160821174802
/http://www.oag.state.md.us/press/zohydro.pdf. The FDA’s 2013 decision to approve 
Zohydro obviously was widely criticized. But, to be clear, this Article does not examine 
whether those criticisms were justified. Indeed, there were also those who argued that FDA’s 
decision to approve Zohydro in 2013 was the appropriate one. In particular, at the time of its 
approval, Zohydro was the only marketed drug that contained the active ingredient 
hydrocodone (an opioid) without also containing acetaminophen (the active ingredient in 
Tylenol®, among other drugs). Acetaminophen overdose is the leading cause of acute liver 
failure in the United States, and acetaminophen-induced liver injury is a serious problem that 
the FDA and public health advocates have long worked to address (albeit one that results in 
far fewer deaths per year than opioid overdoses do). Zohydro offered a hydrocodone option 
for patients without the risks of acetaminophen, which some viewed as particularly important 
for patients with liver problems. See Prescription Drug Products Containing Acetaminophen; 
Actions To Reduce Liver Injury From Unintentional Overdose; Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 2691, 
2692–93 (Jan. 14, 2011); Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of 
Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–5; Michael Ollove, Fearing Abuse, 
States Challenge FDA on Painkiller Approval, PEW CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (Apr. 28, 
2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/04/28/fearing 
-abuse-states-challenge-fda-on-painkiller-approval [https://perma.cc/43AB-TSPC]; cf. Alison 
Bateman-House & Arthur Caplan, Don’t Throw Out Compassion in the War Against 
Opioid Abuse, STAT (June 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/09/opioid-abuse 
-compassion/ [https://perma.cc/WTW3-8MPZ] (highlighting the medical value of opioids). 
 8. See, e.g., Rita Rubin, Critics Oppose FDA Approval of Painkiller Zohydro, WEBMD 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.webmd.com/pain-management/news/20140226/new-painkiller 
-zohydro-criticized [https://perma.cc/G2J5-BG6F].  
 9. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 15, 2014). Numerous media reports described Massachusetts’s action as the first state 
ban on an FDA-approved drug. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, U.S. Judge Set To Rule on Drug 
Firm’s Suit Against Massachusetts for Painkiller Ban, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/2014/04/13/4d8c5424-c189-11e3-bcec 
-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html [https://perma.cc/625C-9YKL]. But that description does not fully 
capture the history of state regulation. Most clearly, as Lars Noah has explained, the Tennessee 
Board of Medical Examiners prohibited the prescribing of two FDA-approved diet drugs in 
the 1990s, before the FDA ultimately withdrew the drugs’ approval. See Noah, supra note 7, 
at 21–22. In addition, several states banned the sale and distribution of FDA-approved 
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short-lived. A federal judge enjoined the ban in April 2014, reasoning that it was 
preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).10 
The Massachusetts Zohydro ban is just one example of a recent surge in states 
regulating drugs that are subject to federal oversight by the FDA.11 As with the 
Zohydro ban, some of these state efforts have involved attempts to impose require-
ments stricter than the federal ones—reflecting concerns that FDA oversight is too 
lax. For instance, Vermont, and, after its Zohydro ban was enjoined, Massachusetts, 
imposed restrictions on the use of Zohydro that fell short of an outright ban but still 
went beyond federal requirements.12 And California enacted a law in 2004 that was 
intended to secure the drug supply chain, by imposing requirements significantly 
more stringent than the federal ones then in place.13  
On the other hand, states have also attempted to establish policies more permis-
sive than federal ones—reflecting concerns that FDA oversight is too restrictive. For 
example, in 2013, Maine enacted a law to permit the importation of unapproved 
drugs from certain countries (which a judge subsequently concluded was preempted 
by federal law).14 At the time of writing, over thirty states have passed “right-to-try” 
laws that are intended to permit terminally ill patients to access unapproved drugs.15 
                                                                                                                 
 
contraceptives in 1960. Id. at 16–17. Those state bans, however, were enacted before Congress 
established the modern FDA drug approval regime, based on both safety and effectiveness, in 
1962. (And were eventually struck down.) There are also several examples of state restrictions 
on, or ultimately unsuccessful attempts to ban, FDA-approved drugs. For instance, after the 
FDA approved mifepristone for terminating pregnancies in 2000, a bill was proposed in 
Oklahoma that would have banned that drug within the state. But it was not enacted. See H.B. 
1038, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001); Noah, supra note 7, at 18–19. Additionally, since 
1962, there have been a number of state laws that restrict access to human drugs (but fall short 
of a total ban) and a few state bans on drugs intended for use in food-producing animals that 
the FDA was considering, but had not yet approved. See Noah, supra note 7, at 17–27. The 
2014 Massachusetts ban on Zohydro, therefore, is not the first state ban on an FDA-approved 
prescription drug. It is, nevertheless, unusual.  
 10. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2. 
 11. See infra Part II.B.; see also Noah, supra note 7 (analyzing state efforts to ban FDA-
approved drugs, focusing on the Zohydro ban). This Article uses the terms “pharmaceutical” 
and “drug” to include both traditional small molecule drugs and biologic therapies. But for 
simplicity, the Article focuses its discussion of statutory language on the language in the 
FDCA. See FDA 101: Regulating Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048341.htm [https://perma.cc/6BCX-6XZQ] 
(last updated Nov. 18, 2015). 
 12. Milton J. Valencia, Mass. Limits Use of the Potent Painkiller Zohydro, BOS. GLOBE 
(Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/04/22/governor-deval-patrick 
-administration-enacts-new-restrictions-zohydro/GpIZM4OUOgZg7cWEI8XV5N/story.html 
[https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20170314124611/http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014 
/04/22/governor-deval-patrick-administration-enacts-new-restrictions-zohydro/GpIZM4OUO 
gZg7cWEI8XV5N/story.html].  
 13. See 2004 Cal. Stat. 6459. 
 14. Ouellette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D. Me. 2015). 
 15. Melissa Healy, Dying Patients Want Easier Access to Experimental Drugs. Here’s 
Why Experts Say That’s Bad Medicine., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www 
.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-right-to-try-medicines-20170314-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/247D-LMPY]. 
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And twenty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, 
have enacted “comprehensive” laws to allow the use of marijuana for medical pur-
poses, without regard to whether the FDA has approved marijuana for such purposes 
(or whether such laws are consistent with the federal Controlled Substances Act).16 
These examples, though not exhaustive, demonstrate the range of state efforts that 
indirectly, and in some cases directly, challenge federal drug regulation.17  
This Article provides an account of this recent state interest in regulating drugs 
and explores how it informs our understanding of the scope of the FDA’s authority 
and the relationship between state and federal drug regulation. The “crucial distinc-
tion between product and practice regulation” is the cornerstone of federalism in 
pharmaceutical regulation.18 That is, courts, lawmakers, and the FDA itself have long 
opined that state jurisdiction is reserved for medical practice—the activities of phy-
sicians and other health care professionals—and federal jurisdiction for medical 
products, including drugs.19 This view of the appropriate roles for state and federal 
regulation arises in part from both a longstanding recognition of the states’ authority 
to regulate medical practice pursuant to their police powers and an appreciation for 
the benefits of national uniformity in drug regulation.20  
The recent surge in drug regulation challenges this practice-products distinction, 
and as other commentators have recently observed, litigation over these new state 
regulatory efforts may provide fresh insights about the preemptive effects of the 
FDA’s authority.21 This Article argues that one such insight is that the preemptive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc
/DMR9-ESAL].  
 17. In practice, patients’ concerns often cut across many of the areas that these state laws 
target. For example, an article in Wired described a father’s attempts to obtain an unapproved 
marijuana product to treat his son’s recalcitrant epilepsy, raising questions about medical ma-
rijuana, seriously ill patients’ access to unapproved drugs, and drug importation, among other 
things. Fred Vogelstein, Boy, Interrupted, WIRED (July 2015), http://www.wired.com
/2015/07/medical-marijuana-epilepsy [https://perma.cc/4Z2A-DNJY]. 
 18. BJ Evans, Distinguishing Product and Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine, 
81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288 (2007).  
 19. See, e.g., id. at 288; Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 
500 (2010); Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice 
of Medicine, 53 KAN. L. REV. 149, 154–71 (2004); Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Fed-
eral Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 430–31 (2015). As I have done else-
where, see Zettler, supra, at 430 n.7, in this Article I use a broad definition of the phrase 
“practice of medicine,” including within that phrase the practice of pharmacy, the practice of 
dentistry, and other health-related practices that states have traditionally regulated. Likewise, 
when I use the term “medical practitioners,” I refer to physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and 
other health care professionals authorized to independently practice medicine. 
 20. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23, 128 (1889); DANIEL 
CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
REGULATION AT THE FDA 73–75 (2010). 
 21. See Nathan A. Brown & Eli Tomar, Could State Regulations Be the Next Frontier for 
Preemption Jurisprudence?: Drug Compounding as a Case Study, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 271 
(2016); Noah, supra note 7, at 2–3; Catherine M. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. 
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reach of the FDA’s authority is broader than the practice-products distinction sug-
gests. The Massachusetts ban on Zohydro and the Maine importation law provide 
instructive examples. Each was framed in terms of medical practice oversight, regu-
lating the activities and licensing of medical practitioners, which is generally consid-
ered to be outside of the FDA’s purview.22 Nevertheless, federal judges concluded 
that both state efforts were impliedly preempted by the FDA’s regulatory regime.23  
The history of U.S. drug regulation suggests that the porousness of the practice-
products distinction revealed by the recent surge in state drug regulation is not a new 
phenomenon. But the continued—and perhaps amplified—blurriness of the practice-
products distinction is particularly important in today’s regulatory environment be-
cause new technologies are also challenging the distinction. The FDA’s hotly con-
tested attempts to assert jurisdiction over innovative medical technologies, such as 
regenerative medicine and genetic testing, have sparked debates about whether those 
technologies are services that are part of medical practice, or are medical products.24 
The thinness of the practice-products binary, revealed by state drug regulation, thus 
may inform questions about the scope of the FDA’s authority. 
Beyond the practice-products distinction, the possibility that courts will conclude 
that the FDA’s extensive oversight preempts state regulation raises the question of 
why states use their limited resources to enact and defend drug laws and regula-
tions.25 This question is further underscored by the fact that some state laws that are 
not preempted may, as a practical matter, have a limited impact on the pharmaceuti-
cal market. State efforts to enact policies more permissive than the FDA’s do not free 
parties from their obligations to comply with federal requirements in many instances, 
and the pharmaceutical industry may have little interest in disturbing the primacy of 
FDA regulation.26 The result is that both the legal and practical impact of at least 
some state regulatory efforts may be equivocal.  
This Article suggests that one reason that states may, nevertheless, find value in 
drug regulation is because it may be a useful strategy for driving federal policy. That 
is, states may not be functioning as neutral innovators—“laboratories for new ideas,” 
                                                                                                                 
 
L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2015); cf. Lindsay F. Wiley, Deregulation, Distrust, and Democracy: 
State and Local Action To Ensure Equitable Access to Healthy, Sustainably Produced Food, 
41 AM. J.L. & MED. 284, 286 (2015) (discussing four recent cases involving state and local 
food regulation “to discuss the foundational legal challenges faced by diverse food reform-
ers”); Diana R. H. Winters, The Benefits of Regulatory Friction in Shaping Policy, 71 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 228 (2016) (examining the policy implications of state action in the areas of food 
and marijuana regulation). 
 22. See Ouellette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D. Me. 2015); Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, 
No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014). 
 23. Ouellette, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 12; Zogenix, Inc., 2014 WL 1454696 at *2.  
 24. See, e.g., PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, 
AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 11 (2015), 
http://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DAR-MTZ4]; Usha Lee McFarling, FDA Moves To Crack Down on Un-
proven Stem Cell Therapies, STAT (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.statnews.com/2016/02/08/fda
-crackdown-stem-cell-clinics [https://perma.cc/979P-2R6T]. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
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in the language of traditional federalism rhetoric.27 Instead, states may be regulating 
to motivate the federal government to adopt particular policies. Put another way, 
even ineffectual laws and regulations may be a mechanism for states to “make[] 
Congress [and the FDA] . . . more honest and democratically accountable regula-
tor[s].”28 Scholars have made such arguments with respect to state regulation in other 
areas, including, perhaps most notably, environmental regulation.29 But state drug 
regulation offers a new context, with a particularly powerful federal regulator, in 
which to examine these state pressures on federal policy. 
To develop these arguments, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains 
how federal drug regulation, and indeed the FDA itself, emerged as a response to 
state regulation. It also examines decades of line drawing between federal and state 
drug regulation, demonstrating that difficulty distinguishing between medical prac-
tice and medical products regulation is longstanding. Part II analyzes the preemptive 
effects of the FDA’s regulatory scheme on recent state efforts to regulate drugs, ar-
guing that the preemptive reach of the FDA’s authority extends into state regulation 
of medical practice in some circumstances. Finally, Part III begins to consider the 
lessons to be learned from recent state drug regulation outside the preemption con-
text. This Part first argues that the blurriness of the practice-products distinction, 
highlighted by state regulation, can inform debates about the proper scope of the 
FDA’s jurisdiction. This Part then starts to examine whether, even when state regu-
lation is preempted or otherwise fails to significantly affect the practices of the drug 
industry, states may nevertheless find regulation a useful strategy for influencing 
federal policy.  
I. THE FDA AS A RESPONSE TO STATE REGULATION 
Today, the federal government rigorously regulates drugs—drugs generally can-
not be sold, prescribed, or dispensed to patients until the federal government deter-
mines that they are safe and effective.30 The federal government, however, did not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995). 
 28. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the Na-
tional Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); see also Miriam Seifter, States as 
Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2014) (describ-
ing other means that states use to influence agencies); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Ac-
countability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2170–72 (2009) (same); Win-
ters, supra note 21 (describing the benefits of “regulatory friction” between states and the 
federal government in the areas of food and controlled substances). 
 29. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: 
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1509–10 (2007); see also Heather K. 
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 57, 91 (2014) (“In environmental-law scholarship, . . . ‘defensive preemption[]’ [is] used 
to describe how state spillovers reverse industry opposition to broadly popular legislation and 
thus break up congressional gridlock.”). 
 30. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-255). Federal law de-
fines “drugs” broadly as products that are intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent 
disease, or to affect the structure or function of the body. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114-255). 
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always have such extensive authority over drugs.31 In fact, as Part I.A explores, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, there is a long history of state drug regulation. Federal 
regulation emerged, in part, as a response to this history of disparate state laws.  
A. The Emergence of the FDA 
“[O]ur Nation has long expressed interest in drug regulation,” and that interest 
was evident within the states (and colonies) well before the FDA was created.32 In-
terestingly, many of these early state and colonial efforts to regulate drugs reflected 
ideas about drug contamination and misbranding that continue to permeate drug law 
today.33 More importantly, early state regulation also demonstrated that the boundary 
between medical practice and medical products—which is thought to serve as a di-
viding line between federal and state jurisdiction today34—has long been blurry.  
Courts and historians have identified a 1736 law, enacted by the Colony of 
Virginia, as the first U.S. drug legislation.35 The law required medical practitioners 
to disclose the ingredients in the drugs that they dispensed.36 In other words, the first 
U.S. legislation intended to regulate drugs (and identified by the D.C. Circuit as do-
ing so) was, in fact, a medical practice law—it restricted the activities of the medical 
practitioners who dispensed drugs, rather than regulating the labeling of the drugs 
themselves.37  
And many early state drug laws that followed were also framed as medical prac-
tice laws. As one example, in 1808, the Territory of Orleans enacted the first U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 1–32. 
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Wallace F. Janssen, America’s First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 665, 
669–70 (1975). 
 36. See SONNEDECKER, supra note 35, at 158. 
 37. Abigail All., 495 F.3d at 703–04. The law was also substantively consistent with cur-
rent federal law. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations require that 
a drug’s labeling reveal its ingredients. 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(e) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
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legislation addressing drug adulteration.38 It prohibited pharmacists from knowingly 
or intentionally selling drugs that were “injured, moulded, discomposed, or sophisti-
cated.”39 Numerous states followed suit, passing medical practice laws that prohib-
ited pharmacists from knowingly or intentionally selling adulterated drugs, rather 
than regulating the drugs’ safety directly by, for example, requiring that the drugs 
themselves not be contaminated.40 Yet, as with the 1736 Virginia law, both the D.C. 
Circuit and historians have characterized these as drug regulation laws despite their 
focus on the activities of medical practitioners.41 
In parallel to these state efforts, interest in federally regulating drugs also began 
to develop. In 1813, Congress passed the Vaccine Act, the first federal consumer 
protection law for drugs, to ensure that physicians inoculated patients against 
smallpox with “genuine vaccine matter.”42 A mere nine years later, however, this 
foray into federal drug regulation ended when the newly created federal vaccine of-
fice mistakenly provided incorrect vaccine matter to a physician, several patients 
contracted smallpox and died as a result, and Congress repealed the law.43 
But recognition of the need for national drug regulation continued to grow despite 
this setback. In 1820, eleven delegates of state medical societies met in Washington, 
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early smallpox vaccinations involved exposing patients to cowpox. Because cowpox is a virus 
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D.C., for the first U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP) convention.44 The goal of the USP was, 
and continues to be, to set quality standards for drugs.45 Although the USP standards 
were not (and still are not) a government document, it represented an attempt to de-
velop national standards for drug quality, and it has been recognized in federal law 
since Congress passed the Import Drug Act of 1848.46 The Import Drug Act, in turn, 
represented the federal government’s second foray into drug regulation.47 Passed in 
response to concerns about contaminated foreign drugs coming into the country, the 
law required that all imported drugs be examined and, if found to be adulterated, 
stopped at the border.48  
For over fifty years, while the Import Drug Act remained the only federal law 
regulating drugs,49 states continued to enact laws primarily to address intentional or 
knowing drug adulteration that was injurious to patients. By 1870, at least twenty-
five states and territories had such laws.50 Consistent with earlier state regulation, 
these were often medical practice laws, regulating the activities of drug dispensers 
rather than the drugs themselves.51 In the late 1800s, state regulation evolved when 
New Jersey enacted the first law that adopted a broader definition of adulteration—
one that, like federal law today, did not require knowledge or intent on the part of the 
drug dispenser, nor injury to the drug recipient.52 And a number of other states, in-
cluding New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan, followed New Jersey by enacting 
laws with broader definitions of adulteration.53 But overall there was little con-
sistency—James Harvey Young, a food and drug historian, described drug regulation 
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at the turn of the twentieth century as a “chaos of divergent and sometimes ludi-
crously severe state laws.”54 
This chaos—as well as two public health crises—led to significant movement to-
ward nationwide consistency when Congress passed two federal laws regulating 
medicines: the Biologics Act of 1902 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.55 
The Biologics Act of 1902 was enacted after biological diphtheria treatments con-
taminated with tetanus killed five children in Missouri and contaminated smallpox 
vaccines killed nine children in New Jersey.56 The law required that sellers of thera-
peutic biological products certify that they properly prepared the products before 
marketing.57 The 1902 Biologics Act, thus, was the first law creating a gatekeeping 
role for the federal government, albeit in a limited way and for a narrow set of 
drugs.58  
Although the Biologics Act was the first to create a drug approval role for the 
government, it is the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 that is credited with estab-
lishing the FDA.59 Reports about food contamination in Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, 
rather than a scandal related to drugs, created the political will to pass the law.60 But 
support for federal oversight of drugs had been building, and the law prohibited the 
sale of both food and drugs that were adulterated or misbranded.61  
The Pure Food and Drugs Act was an important milestone in federal drug regula-
tion, but it did not end state regulation.62 Instead state regulation, arguably, became 
more uniform, with two-thirds of states passing laws that mirrored the new federal 
law.63 Yet a robust market of unsafe and fraudulent drugs persisted, with over 50,000 
“quack” products being sold, producing over $100 million in annual sales.64 Indeed, 
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in its 1910 report, the American Pharmaceutical Association’s Committee on Drug 
Reform noted the following:  
The importance of the National Food and Drugs Law of 1906 need not 
be impressed on pharmaceutical men, nor the benefit already realized 
from it and from the numerous State Laws that have been modeled 
largely upon it. Yet every pharmacist knows that adulteration has by no 
means been eliminated since these laws have been enforced. It might 
seem to many that these laws have operated more to expose the extent of 
adulteration than perceptibly to check it.65 
Given this state of affairs, it is unsurprising that adulterated drugs soon caused a 
public health scandal. In 1937, a Tennessee company used diethylene glycol to make 
a liquid form of sulfanilamide, an antibiotic.66 Diethylene glycol was used as a sol-
vent because of its sweet taste, but it is toxic.67 At the time, federal and state laws did 
not require any premarket safety testing, and the company shipped the drug through-
out the country without first conducting such testing.68 As a result, over one hundred 
people, including many children, died after taking the drug.69  
And tragedy again led to legislative change. In 1938, Congress passed the 
FDCA.70 The law expanded federal authority over drugs in several ways.71 Most im-
portantly, the law created a category of “new drug[s]”—drugs that are not generally 
recognized as safe and effective, or that have not been marketed to a material extent 
and for a material time—and required that companies give the FDA time to assess a 
new drug’s safety before it is marketed.72 That is, the FDCA shifted the FDA’s role 
“from policeman to gatekeeper.”73  
Although the FDA’s role was far more limited under the 1938 law than it is 
today—for example, it was not until 1962 that the companies were required to 
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demonstrate both the safety and effectiveness of their drugs to obtain approval—the 
passage of the FDCA marks the beginning of federal drug regulation that resembles 
the gatekeeping of the modern FDA.74 As with the federal legislation preceding it, 
however, it did not mark the end of state drug regulation.75 
B. Drug Regulation in the Modern Era 
Since the FDCA was enacted, the FDA’s authority over drugs has steadily ex-
panded, and the Agency’s gatekeeping role is now far from its only one. Indeed, the 
FDA now regulates drugs throughout their entire lifecycles in myriad ways, and this 
federal regulation continues to intersect with state regulation.  
1. The FDA 
Today the FDA’s mission with respect to drugs is two-fold: it protects the public 
health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and quality of drugs that are marketed; and, it 
promotes the public health by helping to make drugs available and to make sure that 
the public has the necessary information to properly use those drugs.76 The most 
well-known mechanism through which the FDA accomplishes this mission is its 
gatekeeping function—new drugs cannot be marketed without the FDA’s approval.77 
To approve a brand-name drug, the FDA must determine that the drug is safe and 
effective for its proposed indication, that the proposed labeling is not false or mis-
leading, and that the manufacturing practices used to make the drug are adequate to 
assure its quality.78 The drug’s safety and effectiveness must be demonstrated by 
“substantial evidence,” which generally consists of data from “adequate and well-
controlled” clinical trials.79 The FDA also approves generic new drugs, but through 
an abbreviated process based on evidence demonstrating a generic drug’s similarity 
to the relevant brand-name drug.80  
Whether a company seeks approval of a brand-name or generic drug, it does not 
simply submit an application and wait for the FDA’s assessment of the immense 
amounts of data and information in the application.81 Rather, the drug development 
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and approval process often involves significant communication between the FDA 
and a drug company.82 The FDA also frequently consults with outside experts during 
the approval process—through advisory committee meetings, in which drug compa-
nies and the public also participate.83 When the FDA decides to approve a new drug, 
it publishes a lengthy document describing the data and information supporting ap-
proval, and a quick perusal of any of these “approval packages” demonstrates the 
depth in which the FDA examines drugs during the approval process.84 In other 
words, the FDA’s approval decisions are both comprehensive and somewhat 
collaborative. 
But it is worth emphasizing that when the FDA approves a drug, it does not make 
a determination that the drug is generally safe and effective. Instead, the FDA ap-
proves a drug as safe and effective only for the particular uses recommended in the 
approved labeling—that is, to treat a particular disease or condition, in a particular 
patient population, at a particular dose.85 Once the FDA has approved a drug for a 
particular indication, however, medical practitioners can generally prescribe the drug 
for any purpose, including unapproved uses (known as “off-label” uses).86 
Although the FDA’s authority to approve drugs is critical to its public health mis-
sion, that role is just one of many ways that the agency regulates drugs. Its authorities 
are manifold and cover the entire lifecycle of a drug, from the beginning stages of 
research through its use after approval.87 For example, before a drug’s approval, FDA 
regulates clinical trials and certain other research with the drug and prohibits promo-
tion of the drug.88 As another example, in addition to assessing the manufacturing 
practices for a drug at the time of its approval, the FDA requires that drugs be man-
ufactured in compliance with “current good manufacturing practice” throughout their 
lifespan.89 As a third example, after a prescription drug’s approval, the FDA oversees 
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its advertising and promotion.90 In fact, the most-discussed area of the FDA’s 
postapproval regulation may be its position that promoting off-label uses leads to 
violations of the FDCA.91  
In sum, the FDA’s role as a gatekeeper for drugs is vital to its public health mis-
sion. But gatekeeping is only one aspect of FDA regulation. The FDA regulates drugs 
across their life cycle in numerous, different ways, under numerous different author-
ities that have evolved over time and intersect with state efforts to regulate drugs.92 
2. The States 
In light of the comprehensive system of FDA drug regulation, federal regulation 
is now generally characterized as dominant in this area.93 This characterization, while 
fair, may obscure the continued role of states in drug regulation.94 As this Part 
demonstrates, state drug regulation has evolved from its historical prominence to 
largely consist of tort law schemes and state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts that 
complement or parallel FDA regulation.  
State tort law has been described as the primary means through which states reg-
ulate drugs.95 Commentators, and the FDA itself, have explained that state products 
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liability schemes complement FDA regulation by providing a mechanism for pri-
vately policing postapproval drug safety and compensating injured patients.96 Be-
cause of the FDA’s extensive oversight of drug design and manufacturing, injured 
patients have generally sued drug manufacturers for inadequate labeling.97 Indeed, 
injured patients have brought a “steady stream” of failure-to-warn cases against pre-
scription drug manufacturers.98 Yet, as discussed further in Part II below, recent 
Supreme Court opinions have significantly limited the circumstances in which such 
claims are available against generic drug manufacturers.  
In addition to products liability regimes, states also have long had their own Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Acts that impose requirements parallel to the federal FDCA.99 
Today, the majority of states with these laws have adopted the Uniform State Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which was created in 1984 by the Association of Food and 
Drug Officials (AFDO), the primary organization for state food and drug officials.100 
The AFDO was formed to foster uniformity among state food and drug laws, and its 
model Uniform Act includes a provision to automatically incorporate into state law 
changes to the federal FDCA—to produce state laws that are identical to one another 
and federal law.101 In reality, however, there is some variation between state Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Acts both because not all states have adopted this provision, and 
because not all states have adopted the Uniform Act.102 
                                                                                                                 
 
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation 
of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 933 (“Given the limitations of FDA review, tort 
law has traditionally served as a complementary means of regulating medical products and an 
additional layer of consumer protection.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988–89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter Generic Drug Labeling Proposed Rule]; Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 95, at 
475–76. As Kessler and Vladeck explain, the FDA did, however, go through a period of time 
during President George W. Bush’s administration in which it asserted that state tort law, ra-
ther than complementing FDA regulation, “threaten[ed] [the agency’s] ability to protect the 
public health.” Id. at 463. 
 97. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 
Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142) (“[T]he FDCA would 
preempt a pure design-defect claim where . . . the claim does not require the plaintiff to prove 
that the manufacturer knew or should have known of new and scientifically significant evi-
dence that rendered the drug ‘misbranded’ under federal law.”). 
 98. Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 95, at 462.  
 99. See, e.g., FDA, INVESTIGATIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL § 3.3.3 (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/UCM497756.pdf [https://perma.cc
/77Y7-JVS5]; see also supra Part I.A; cf. Matt Lamkin, Regulating Identity: Medical Regula-
tion as Social Control, 2016 BYU L. REV. 501, 539 (2016) (“[S]tates regulate controlled sub-
stances in ways that mirror the federal [Controlled Substances Act].”).  
 100. See FDA, supra note 99; About, ASS’N OF FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS, http://www.afdo
.org/about [https://perma.cc/G8UU-KDP5]. As of 2012, forty-two states had adopted all or 
some of the Uniform State Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD 
A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 290 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 101. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 100, at 290; About, supra note 100. 
 102. See, e.g., FDA, supra note 99, at § 3.3.3; HUTT ET AL., supra note 100, at 290. 
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State laws identical (or almost identical) to federal law, of course, do not substan-
tively add to or challenge the FDA’s regulatory scheme. Instead, such laws may show 
that states (and the AFDO) recognize that the FDA’s resources are limited.103 The 
agency simply cannot monitor and penalize every violation of the FDCA, and state 
laws identical to the FDCA could allow states to fill these gaps by enforcing require-
ments related to drug safety and efficacy, just as the FDA does.104 Consistent with 
this idea, states do not regulate drugs under their laws in isolation from the FDA.105 
Many states have an agreement with the FDA that permits information sharing and 
coordination.106 In some areas where the FDA’s statutory authority has been chal-
lenged or otherwise is less clear, such as drug compounding, states have played a 
significant regulatory role in the modern era.107 But state enforcement of their own 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts appears to be rare.108 Nevertheless, regardless of how 
strictly states enforce state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts or how vigorously private 
parties pursue products liability claims, these state schemes ultimately represent ef-
forts to complement or amplify the reach of the FDA’s requirements.  
II. PRACTICE, PRODUCTS, AND PREEMPTION 
Unlike products liability regimes and state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts in-
tended to complement FDA requirements, recent state drug regulation efforts seem 
intended to challenge the FDA’s regulatory scheme. This recent surge in state drug 
regulation, thus, may provide new insights about the preemptive reach of the FDA’s 
authority.109 To consider these insights, this Part starts by discussing preemption in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359, 360 (2014) (describing parallel requirements in the food and 
drug context). 
 104. See, e.g., William F. Reindollar, The Association of Food and Drug Officials, 6 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 52, 53–54 (1951). 
 105. See FDA, supra note 99, at § 3.3.3; see also Salthe, supra note 75, at 165 (“The con-
sumer will receive the greatest amount of this protection when federal, state and municipal 
food and drug officials cooperate in the enforcement of a uniform law.”); cf. Anna Wexler, A 
Pragmatic Analysis of the Regulation of Consumer Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
(TDCS) Devices in the United States, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 669, 687–91 (2015) (describing 
an example of federal cooperation with a state enforcement action related to devices). 
 106. See FDA, supra note 99, at § 3.3.2. 
 107. See, e.g., Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969 (2012). Drug compounding refers to a manufacturing practice that 
involves a medical practitioner combining, mixing, or altering drug ingredients to create an 
individualized medication for a patient. See Pharmacy Compounding: Implications of the 2012 
Meningitis Outbreak: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 
112th Cong. 21 (2012) (testimony of Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin.). 
 108. See, e.g., John Shaeffer, Prescription Drug Advertising—Should States Regulate 
What Is False and Misleading?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 629, 629 (2003) (“States have delegated 
much of their enforcement of drug safety to private citizens, who are empowered to bring tort 
actions.”); cf. Marc T. Law, The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 
1103, 1107–09 (2003) (discussing the history of weak state enforcement in the context of 
food). 
 109. See Brown & Tomar, supra note 21; Noah, supra note 7; Sharkey, supra note 21.  
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the products liability context, where state drug regulation is more widely understood 
to coexist and where the Supreme Court has spoken. This Part then describes and 
considers five examples of the recent surge of state drug regulation, arguing that one 
insight from this surge is that the preemptive effects of the FDA’s authority extend 
into state regulation of medical practice in some instances.  
A. Products Liability  
Although “the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal 
Government,” the basic premise of preemption is that Congress may choose to dis-
place state law.110 That is, when federal and state law conflict, the state law is “with-
out effect.”111 A preemption analysis “start[s] with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded . . . unless that [was] the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.”112 Accordingly, courts’ preemption analyses ul-
timately center on congressional intent.113 
Preemption is express when a federal law explicitly provides that it displaces state 
oversight.114 Federal law may also impliedly preempt state law in several ways. Field 
preemption occurs when Congress intended federal law to occupy the entire regula-
tory field.115 Conflict preemption, however, is the more commonly relied-upon the-
ory of implied preemption in food and drug law.116 State law can conflict with federal 
law, and thus be impliedly preempted, either when compliance with both state and 
federal requirements is impossible (impossibility preemption), or when state law 
thwarts the purpose of the federal law (obstacle preemption).117 Implied preemption 
theories are generally most relevant in drug products liability cases because there is 
no provision in the FDCA that expressly preempts products liability claims against 
drug manufacturers.118  
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 
455, 458 (1990)). 
 111. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  
 112. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); cf. McCuskey, supra note 92 (discussing and critiquing a broad 
presumption against preemption, based on a history of state regulation, in health law). 
 113. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
 114. E.g., id. 
 115. E.g., id. 
 116. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of 
Prescription Drugs, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 247–49 (2010). 
 117. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563–
64 (2009) (discussing impossibility and obstacle preemption). 
 118. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574–75. The FDCA does contain a provision that ex-
pressly preempts state and local requirements for over-the-counter drug labeling that differ 
from federal requirements, but that provision also indicates that it is not intended “to modify 
or otherwise affect . . . the liability of any person under the product liability law of any State.” 
21 U.S.C. § 379r(e) (2012). Thus, preemption disputes about over-the-counter drugs fre-
quently focus on whether the case in fact involves products liability law. See, e.g., Kanter v. 
Warner-Lambert Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). The FDCA also contains 
an express preemption provision regarding state and local requirements for certain devices, 
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Case law and scholarship in the products liability context—the area in which most 
FDA preemption litigation has occurred, and in which the Supreme Court has re-
cently spoken—are helpful for considering the preemptive effects of FDA regulation 
on divergent state regulation.119 In Wyeth v. Levine, a patient sued the manufacturer 
of a brand-name, injectable medication for failing to adequately warn of the risks of 
gangrene associated with certain methods of injection.120 Although the drug manu-
facturer argued that the plaintiff’s case was impliedly preempted under both impos-
sibility and obstacle theories, the Court disagreed.121 The Court explained that the 
“powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”122 In other words, the Court under-
scored the presumption against concluding that Congress intended federal law to 
preempt state law.123 And the Court concluded that, in this instance, Congress in-
tended to preserve state tort law noting, among other things, that FDA regulations 
permit manufacturers of brand-name drugs to update their drug’s labeling with new 
warnings before the FDA approves the change, and the 1962 amendments to the 
FDCA included a provision “indicating that a . . . state law would only be invalidated 
upon a ‘direct and positive conflict’ with the FDCA.”124 
But several Supreme Court decisions after Wyeth clarified that the preemptive 
effect of the FDA’s regulation of generic drugs is more extensive and chipped away 
at the notion that Congress intended to preserve state drug law in all circumstances.125 
                                                                                                                 
 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted as preempting some state common law causes of 
action; however, that provision is outside the scope of this Article. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012); 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322–24 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 492–502 (1996). 
 119. See, e.g., Brown & Tomar, supra note 21; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008); see also Lars 
Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards 
Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 907–908 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court’s in-
creasing willingness to find tort law, as well as positive law, preempted). 
 120. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558–60; see also Ausness, supra note 116, at 280 (explaining the 
Wyeth decision). 
 121. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–64, 581; see also Erika Fisher Lietzan & Sarah E. Pitlyk, 
Thoughts on Preemption in the Wake of the Levine Decision, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 
225, 229–252 (2010) (discussing the Wyeth majority’s analysis of impossibility and obstacle 
preemption claims).  
 122. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 123. See Ausness, supra note 116, at 280–81. 
 124. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (quoting Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, sec. 
202, 76 Stat. 780, 793); see also Noah, supra note 7, at 8 (noting this language as one piece of 
evidence that Congress intended to preserve state authority).  
 125. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 
U.S. 604 (2011). The Supreme Court’s findings of implied preemption in PLIVA and Bartlett 
are not inconsistent with the 1962 provision cited in Wyeth. The language stating that state 
laws are invalidated only upon a “direct and positive conflict” with the FDCA can be viewed 
as a restatement of the impossibility theory of implied preemption. And, indeed, some courts 
have interpreted similar savings clauses in this way. See S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes 
County, 288 F.3d 584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002); Christine H. Kim, The Case for Preemption of 
Prescription Drug Failure-To-Warn Claims, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 410 (2007); Noah, 
supra note 7, at 8–9. 
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In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, patients who developed tardive dyskinesia—a neurolog-
ical disorder—from long-term use of a generic drug sued the drug manufacturer.126 
At the time that the patients were prescribed the drug, its labeling did not include a 
warning about the link between long-term use and tardive dyskinesia.127 The plain-
tiffs argued that the drug manufacturers breached a state tort law duty by failing to 
add such a warning, and, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the FDA 
had required that manufacturers add the warning.128 Nevertheless, the majority con-
cluded that the drug manufacturers were not liable to the plaintiffs on impossibility 
preemption grounds.129 The majority noted that the FDCA and the FDA’s imple-
menting regulations require that a generic drug’s labeling be the “same” as the brand-
name drug’s labeling, and the brand-name drug’s labeling lacked a warning about 
long-term use and tardive dyskinesia at the time of the plaintiffs’ injuries.130 In the 
majority’s view, it, therefore, was impossible for the drug manufacturers to comply 
both with federal labeling requirements, and with the state-law duty to update their 
drug’s labeling with a new warning.131 
Two years later, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Company v. Bartlett, the Supreme 
Court faced a very similar case.132 The plaintiff, again, was a patient who had been 
injured by a generic drug—in this case, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory pain re-
liever.133 The plaintiff argued that the drug manufacturer was liable for her injuries 
on the theory that the design of the drugs was unreasonably unsafe, because the 
drugs’ labeling failed to warn of the rare and serious skin reaction that the plaintiff 
suffered.134 Relying on its decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing and applying the same 
impossibility rationale, the majority held that design-defect claims against generic 
drug manufacturers that turn on the adequacy of the drug’s labeling are preempted.135 
The majority found unpersuasive the plaintiff’s argument that,  because the generic 
drug manufacturer could have simply chosen not to sell the drug in states with re-
quirements that conflict with federal law, it was not impossible for the manufacturer 
to comply with both state and federal requirements.136  
Regardless of one’s view of the merits of this outcome,137 Bartlett may signal 
trouble for some of the recent state drug regulatory efforts. The majority opinion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. 564 U.S. at 610. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 609–10. 
 129. Id. at 618. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. As the majority did in Wyeth, in dissent in PLIVA Justice Sotomayor cited the 
provision in the 1962 amendments to the FDCA preserving state authority as evidence that 
Congress did not intend to preempt state tort law claims against drug manufacturers. Id. at 633 
(Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 132. 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 2471–72.  
 135. Id. at 2476–77. 
 136. Id. at 2477. 
 137. Numerous scholars have criticized PLIVA and Bartlett on both legal and policy 
grounds. See, e.g., LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 556–57 (3d ed. 
2012); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a 
Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 
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suggested that imposing tort liability in the factual circumstances in Bartlett would 
be similar to a state “directly prohibiting the product’s sale”138—indicating that the 
Court may find a prohibition on an FDA-approved drug, or other types of state posi-
tive law, to be preempted on impossibility grounds in some circumstances.139 Justice 
Breyer’s dissent (which was joined by Justice Kagan) also suggested a path forward 
for challenging recent state regulation on implied preemption grounds. Although 
Justice Breyer agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that it was not impossible for the 
manufacturer to comply with both state and federal requirements, his dissent 
acknowledged that state requirements may pose an obstacle to federal ones in some 
circumstances.140 An obstacle preemption argument, in his view, becomes stronger 
the more “medically valuable” a particular drug is.141 Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) was more skeptical of an obstacle preemption 
argument but, nevertheless, similarly acknowledged obstacle preemption “presents a 
closer question than the impossibility argument.”142 Taken together, the dissents and 
the majority opinion, thus, suggest for the potential to persuade a majority of the 
Court that recent state regulatory efforts are preempted by the FDCA, depending on 
the circumstances. 
Although PLIVA and Bartlett significantly limit the role of state tort law regimes 
in drug regulation,143 viable avenues for bringing products liability claims against 
drug manufacturers may remain or reemerge.144 So-called “parallel claims” are per-
haps the most widely applicable avenue left for products liability claims against ge-
neric drug manufacturers.145 Parallel claims are based on state tort-law duties that are 
                                                                                                                 
 
343–45 (2015); Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’ Unfortunate Hand, 
12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 209, 235–45 (2012). 
 138. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478 n.5; see also Noah, supra note 7, at 34 n.137. 
 139. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478 n.5; Noah, supra note 7, at 34 n.137.  
 140. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting); Noah, 
supra note 7, at 31.  
 141. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 2493 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 143. This is because generic drugs comprise approximately eighty-eight percent of pre-
scription drugs used in the United States. GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN 
THE U.S. 1 (2015), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report
_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/736L-75UR]. 
 144. Perhaps most obviously, Supreme Court jurisprudence has not foreclosed failure-to-
warn, and other labeling-based claims, against the manufacturers of brand-name drugs. Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). But as explained, see supra note 143, brand-name drugs are 
only a small part of the market. Additionally, because of changes to the FDCA that were en-
acted after the events that gave rise to Wyeth, the case may not foreclose all findings of implied 
preemption against brand-name manufacturers. See Evans, supra note 19, at 517. Contract, 
rather than tort, claims may be another avenue for injured patients. See Max N. Helveston, 
Preemption Without Borders: The Modern Conflation of Tort and Contract Liabilities, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 1085, 1105 (2014).  
 145. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 103, at 362–63. The other pathways for suing generic 
drug manufacturers that exist or may reemerge may not be as widely applicable, or may be 
challenged, for a variety of reasons. First, failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manu-
facturers may once again be viable if the FDA finalizes a proposed rule that would permit 
generic drug manufacturers to unilaterally add or strengthen warnings in the labeling, just as 
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identical to or incorporate, rather than conflict with, federal requirements and gener-
ally have survived preemption challenges.146 For example, after PLIVA and Bartlett, 
failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers who have failed to update 
their labeling to match the brand-name drug’s labeling—as required by both state 
and federal law—have continued to withstand preemption challenges.147 Likewise, 
where state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts incorporate the federal FDCA’s prohibi-
tions, plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims that are premised on violations of sections of 
the state law that mirror federal law may survive preemption.148  
Nevertheless, courts have concluded that parallel claims are preempted in some 
circumstances. For example, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, and 
subsequent interpretations of the case, the Supreme Court articulated the idea that 
even parallel state requirements can be preempted when they “encroach[] upon an 
agency’s territory.”149 That is, state enforcement of parallel requirements might 
                                                                                                                 
 
brand-name drug manufacturers can do. See Generic Drug Labeling Proposed Rule, supra note 
96, at 67,988–89. But whether the FDA has the statutory authority to make the proposed 
changes to generic drug labeling requirements is hotly disputed. See, e.g., Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, Comments on the Proposed Rule “Supplemental Applications 
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products” at 2–4 (Mar. 13, 
2014), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2013-N-0500-0067
&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQ2-WVPX]. Second, a few 
courts have held that, in certain circumstances, brand-name drug manufacturers may be held 
liable for the injuries caused by generic copies of their drugs, if the brand-name manufacturers 
provided false or misleading information that led to the injury. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, Inc., 
762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014); Conte 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008). But such decisions are in the clear mi-
nority—indeed, in Alabama, the legislature overrode the court’s decision in Wyeth v. Weeks, 
eliminating, by statute, brand-name drug companies’ liability for injuries caused by generic 
copies of their drugs. See 2015 Ala. Acts 106 (2015); Wyeth, 159 So. 3d at 696 (Murdock, J. 
dissenting) (describing the majority rule); see also Katie Thomas, Man Taking Generic Drug 
Can Sue Branded Maker, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/01/12/business/court-says-pfizer-can-be-sued-by-man-who-took-generic.html [https://
perma.cc/CTL7-FMQR] (quoting a drug industry lawyer as stating that the Alabama decision 
“is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority on this issue nationwide”).  
 146. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); Sharkey, supra note 103, at 
362–63. 
 147. See Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Sharkey, supra note 103, at 
362–63.  
 148. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 97, at 23. 
Additionally, in at least one circumstance outside the products liability context, such a parallel 
claim has survived a preemption argument. In Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Allergan 
successfully obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting its competitor, Athena Cosmetics, 
from selling a product within California because Athena Cosmetics was violating California’s 
Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by selling a new drug without FDA approval. Allergan, Inc. 
v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., 738 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit held that the 
relevant provisions of California’s UCL were not preempted by the FDCA because the “pro-
visions . . . parallel the FDCA, such that the statutes have consistent goals.”  Id. at 1356. 
 149. Sharkey, supra note 103, at 374; see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (“State-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the 
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conflict with federal requirements, for example by undermining federal agencies’ 
prerogative to exercise discretion in how they enforce federal law. The parallel claims 
context, as with the failure-to-warn and design-defect contexts, therefore suggests 
that courts are willing to conclude in at least some circumstances that Congress in-
tended FDA oversight to displace the states’ role in drug regulation—and may fore-
tell courts finding that certain recent state drug regulation efforts may be preempted. 
B. Divergent State Regulation 
Because recent state efforts to regulate drugs, unlike state tort law regimes and 
state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts, are generally intended to diverge from the 
FDA’s regulatory scheme, these efforts present an opportunity to consider the 
preemptive reach of the FDA’s drug authority in a fresh context.150 Indeed, scholars 
and commentators have begun to weigh in, with varying views of the viability of 
claims that FDA regulation preempts particular areas of state positive law.151  
Examining the potential clash between existing state regulation of drug com-
pounding and the FDA’s recently expanded authority in this area, two attorneys, 
Nathan Brown and Eli Tomar, have predicted that courts may conclude that certain 
state regulation of drug compounding presents an obstacle to the mission of the 
FDA.152 Drawing on cases about food and cosmetic regulation, they argued that 
                                                                                                                 
 
FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s judgment and ob-
jectives.”). Buckman involved a device rather than a drug, but is nevertheless instructive. In 
Buckman, the plaintiffs claimed to be injured by orthopedic bone screws, which, the plaintiffs 
argued, the FDA authorized for marketing on the basis of fraudulent information submitted by 
the company. The plaintiffs sought damages under state tort law on the basic theory that the 
company’s fraudulent representations were “a ‘but for’ cause of injuries that plaintiffs sus-
tained from the implantation of these devices: Had the representations not been made, the FDA 
would not have approved the devices, and plaintiffs would not have been injured.” 531 U.S. 
at 343; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Permitting the State 
to impose its own penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful frame-
work Congress adopted.”). 
 150. Recent state regulatory efforts also present an opportunity to assess some of the pos-
sible preemptive effects of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 
2007, which amended the FDCA to significantly expand the FDA’s postmarket drug safety 
authorities. Cf. Evans, supra note 19, at 515–17 (discussing the effect of FDAAA on brand-
name manufacturers’ products liability); Parasidis, supra note 95, at 937–49 (discussing the 
evolution of the FDA’s postmarket authorities, including FDAAA). Among other things, 
FDAAA authorized the FDA to require Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for 
certain prescription drugs. For further discussion of REMS and preemption, see infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 151. See Brown & Tomar, supra note 21; Noah, supra note 7; cf. Sharkey, supra note 21 
(arguing that courts should consider the FDA’s view of state regulation in obstacle preemption 
cases). 
 152. See generally Brown & Tomar, supra note 21. Congress passed the Drug Quality and 
Security Act of 2013 in part to expand the FDA’s authority over drug compounding after a 
fatal fungal meningitis outbreak in 2012 that was linked to compounded drugs. E.g., Kevin 
Outterson, The Drug Quality and Security Act—Mind the Gaps, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 97 
(2014). 
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courts are “more willing to strike state regulations that are not impossible to abide, 
but which complicate industry’s compliance with an overarching federal pro-
gram.”153 For example, courts have struck down, on implied preemption grounds, a 
California law establishing a standard for weight variance in bagged flour that dif-
fered from the federal law and a Minnesota law that required cosmetics to bear a 
warning about chlorofluorocarbons additional to the federally required one.154 Nei-
ther state law made compliance with federal law impossible; the courts’ reasoning in 
both cases focused on the states’ disruption of the federal governments’ balancing of 
numerous considerations, such as the public health benefits of stricter regulation and 
the costs to industry and consumers.155 In other words, according to Brown and 
Tomar, this line of cases—and, arguably, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Bartlett and 
some of the parallel claims decisions—suggests that courts may have an increasingly 
favorable view towards obstacle preemption arguments. These cases, therefore, may 
suggest an obstacle preemption rationale for courts to strike down certain recent state 
efforts to regulate drugs. 
Lars Noah has argued that state bans on FDA-approved drugs—for which there 
will often be strong arguments that state action disrupts the careful balancing of the 
FDA’s approval decisions—may not always be preempted.156 Although Bartlett sug-
gests that at least some Supreme Court Justices are inclined to conclude that such 
state bans are preempted, the outcome of any preemption litigation will ultimately 
depend on the precise context within which a state imposes such a ban.157 For exam-
ple, a state ban might be more likely to survive a preemption challenge if it reflects 
unique local concerns or is implemented many years after a drug’s initial approval 
as a result of new information that the FDA did not consider.158 Additionally, the 
language from the 1962 amendments to the FDCA preserving state authority except 
where it “direct[ly] and positive[ly] conflict[s]” with those amendments, cited by the 
majority in Wyeth, provides evidence that Congress did not intend FDA approval 
decisions to preempt state bans on any theory other than impossibility.159 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Brown & Tomar, supra note 21, at 285; cf. Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug 
Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 571, 601 (2001) (“To the extent that recent Supreme Court cases have reinvigorated 
implied preemption in cases where state law stands as an ‘obstacle’ to the achievement of 
federal purposes, one could argue that any state efforts to prohibit or restrict distribution of 
mifepristone would create an impermissible conflict with federal law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 154. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540–43 (1977); Cosmetic, Toiletry & 
Fragrance Ass’n., Inc. v. Minnesota, 440 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (D. Minn. 1977), aff’d, 575 F.2d 
1256 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 155. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 540–43; Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Ass’n., 440 F. Supp. 
at 1222. 
 156. E.g., Noah, supra note 7. Noah also examines dormant commerce clause and substan-
tive due process objections to state bans on FDA-approved drugs, likewise concluding the 
outcome of such challenges would depend on the precise factual context in which a ban is 
established. See id. at 35–54. 
 157. See id. at 3–16, 27–35. 
 158. See id. at 53–54. 
 159. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, sec. 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793; see Noah, 
supra note 7, at 8–9. Although this language clearly presents a hurdle to the success of implied 
preemption theories other than impossibility, it may not be an insurmountable hurdle. The 
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This Part considers these preemption arguments within the context of specific ex-
amples of state regulation that diverge from federal requirements, starting with 
examples for which there is a stronger case that state regulation is preempted. The 
examples provided are not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they illustrate the varied 
ways that state regulatory efforts intersect with the FDA’s authority.160 Ultimately, 
these examples do not provide a categorical answer to when state drug regulation is 
preempted.161 But they do demonstrate that in many cases there are plausible argu-
ments that, because of the FDA’s wide-ranging oversight, its regulation preempts 
divergent state regulatory efforts. 
                                                                                                                 
 
language was not codified and expressly applied only to the 1962 amendments to the FDCA. 
Sec. 202, 76 Stat. at 793. Congress has changed and expanded the FDA’s authority numerous 
times since 1962, and many recent state regulatory efforts intersect with these newer aspects 
of FDA regulation. E.g., Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305
.htm [https://perma.cc/XS4J-BD5A] (last updated Dec. 19, 2014). And in the recent Supreme 
Court preemption decisions in the products liability context, there is evidence to suggest that 
various Justices believed that, although this language is some evidence of Congress’s intent 
not to displace state law absent an impossibility argument, it is not dispositive. See Mut. 
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480–81 (2013) (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (acknowledging obstacle preemption as a possibility); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
612 n.4 (2009) (Alito, J. dissenting) (arguing this language “simply recognizes the background 
principles of conflict pre-emption”); cf. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2493 (Sotomayor, J., joined by 
Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting obstacle preemption “presents a closer question than the im-
possibility argument” despite this language); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 
870–72 (2000) (arguing that a similar savings clause does not preclude obstacle theories). 
 160. As one example, this Article does not discuss in depth state laws restricting the use of 
drugs intended for pregnancy termination. Nineteen states require that a physician be physi-
cally present when a patient takes such drugs. And several states also require that pregnancy 
termination drugs be used according to their FDA-approved labels, whereas off-label use is 
generally permitted in other contexts. (These on-label use laws, however, no longer meaning-
fully restrict access to pregnancy termination drugs because in March 2016, the FDA approved 
updated labeling for the drugs that reflects the current standard of care.) As with the Maine 
and Massachusetts regulatory efforts, state laws governing pregnancy termination drugs are 
generally medical practice laws, limiting how practitioners may prescribe the drug. Whether 
FDA authority preempts these laws may raise similar issues to those discussed with respect to 
Vermont and Massachusetts’s restrictions on the use of Zohydro, albeit complicated by the 
constitutional questions around access to abortion. See, e.g., Zettler, supra note 19, at 449, 449 
n. 123; Sandhya Somashekhar & Laurie McGinley, The FDA Just Made the Abortion Pill 
Easier To Get, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fda 
-updates-recommendations-for-abortion-pill/2016/03/30/426407de-f681-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/8VP5-QBLU]; State Laws and Policies: Medication Abortion, 
GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion 
[https://perma.cc/8R9R-C25U](last updated Apr. 1, 2017). As another example, several states 
and localities require a prescription for pseudoephedrine, a decongestant that, under federal 
law, may be sold over-the-counter. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & 
TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PSEUDOEPHEDRINE: 
LEGAL EFFORTS TO MAKE IT A PRESCRIPTION-ONLY DRUG (2013), https://www.cdc.gov
/phlp/docs/pseudo-brief112013.pdf [https://perma.cc/24VK-MWQP]. 
 161. See Noah, supra note 7, at 53–54. 
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1. Maine’s Drug Importation Law 
Because prescription drugs are notoriously expensive in the United States, pa-
tients sometimes want to purchase them from countries where they are cheaper.162 
Although it is illegal for individuals to import drugs not approved by the FDA (or 
that otherwise violate the FDCA), the FDA does not stop individuals from importing 
such drugs for personal use in certain circumstances.163 Nevertheless, the FDA has 
been criticized for too strictly enforcing drug import requirements and chilling even 
the personal importation to which the agency does not object.164  
In response, states have explored allowing their citizens access to inexpensive 
imported drugs.165 The FDA has consistently opined that importing unapproved 
drugs from other countries is prohibited under federal law and that such drugs raise 
significant safety concerns because they may be counterfeit or low quality.166 The 
FDA has also said that state drug importation laws are impliedly preempted by the 
FDCA under theories of field, impossibility, and obstacle preemption.167 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. See Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices and Availability of Pharma-
ceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, 3 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVES 521 (2003); see 
also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription 
Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016) 
(discussing “growing concern” about increasing prescription drug prices). 
 163. The conditions that must be met for the FDA to use its discretion to permit personal 
importation include that the individual has a serious condition for which no effective treatment 
is available in the United States. See Is It Legal for Me To Personally Import Drugs?, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194904.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C2AZ-7PHX] (last updated Mar. 4, 2016). 
 164. See, e.g., Peter S. Reichertz & Melinda S. Friend, Hiding Behind Agency Discretion: 
The Food and Drug Administration’s Personal Use Drug Importation Policy, 9 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 493 (2000). 
 165. See Importing Prescription Drugs: Letters to State and Local Officials, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm170594.htm [https://perma.cc 
/A2CV-UGCV] (last updated Sept. 29, 2014). 
 166. See, e.g., Letter from William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Comm’r for Policy & Planning, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gregory Gonot, Deputy Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 
25, 2003), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm179893.htm [https://perma.cc/84FK 
-CP5K]; Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Linda Lingle, Governor, State of Haw. (Aug. 14, 2008), https://www.fda.gov
/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm179204.htm [https://perma.cc/WT3M-Y5L4]; see also Letter from 
Robert M. Califf, Margaret B. Hamburg, Mark B. McClellan & Andrew Von Eschenbach to 
Members of Congress (Mar. 16, 2017), https://healthpolicy.duke.edu/sites/default/files/atoms
/files/2017_03_16_commissioners_letter_final.pdf [https://webcache.googleusercontent.com
/search?q=cache:UmGcEUmUPlUJ:https://healthpolicy.duke.edu/sites/default/files/atoms/files 
/2017_03_16_commissioners_letter_final.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us] (explaining 
four former FDA commissioners’ concerns about importing unapproved drugs). 
 167. See, e.g., Letter from William K. Hubbard to Gregory Gonot, supra note 166. In its 
letters, the FDA does not address the language in the 1962 amendments preserving state au-
thority except in cases of a “direct and positive” conflict. This may be because the FDA’s 
letters primarily focus on statutory provisions that were not enacted as part of the 1962 amend-
ments, because the FDA does not view that language as dispositive of preemption questions, 
or because of the unique intersection between the FDA’s importation authority and federal 
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Nevertheless, in 2013, Maine enacted a law to allow its citizens to purchase pre-
scription drugs from certain foreign pharmacies.168 The law was cleverly crafted to 
be within states’ traditional powers to regulate medical practice, and outside the 
FDA’s sphere of medical products regulation. Like all states, Maine requires phar-
macies to be licensed.169 The 2013 drug importation law, however, exempted from 
this state licensing requirement retail pharmacies located in Canada, the U.K., 
Ireland, Australia, or New Zealand.170 According to Maine, the law “reduce[d] the 
reach of [Maine’s unauthorized practice of pharmacy law] . . . ‘leaving to the federal 
government the enforcement of any federal laws that regulate the sale of prescription 
drugs to Mainers by pharmacies located in certain foreign countries.’”171  
Framing the drug importation law as medical practice regulation was not, how-
ever, sufficient to save it from a preemption challenge.172 In her opinion striking 
down the law, Judge Nancy Torresen of the District of Maine explained that, despite 
its framing, the law “extend[ed] beyond the regulation and licensure of pharmacies 
and pharmacists in Maine” to the field of “the importation of foreign pharmaceuti-
cals.”173 And, in light of the Maine law’s scope, she struck it down on the basis of 
field preemption, finding that Congress intended “to occupy the field of pharmaceu-
tical importation.”174 Judge Torresen, thus, considered the underlying intent of the 
law—to allow drug importation—as well as the practical effect of the law in deter-
mining how the law may intersect with the FDA’s jurisdiction.  
This case, however, may not be particularly informative for other state drug regu-
lation efforts because Maine’s law not only intersects with the FDA’s authority, but 
also with federal oversight of foreign commerce.175 As Judge Torresen explained, 
there is a “presumption in favor of preemption where a state legislates in the tradi-
tional federal area of foreign affairs . . . based in part on a need for federal uniformity 
regarding foreign commerce.”176 Moreover, the opinion notes that Congress ex-
pressly considered drug importation from Canada when enacting the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA).177 Under the 
MMA, Canadian drug imports are permissible only when the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services determines that such imports would be 
safe and cost-effective—and no Secretary has made such a determination.178 Field 
                                                                                                                 
 
oversight of foreign commerce generally. 
 168. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13731 (Supp. 2016). 
 169. See id.; see also Zettler, supra note 19, at 450 (“[A]ll fifty states have boards that are 
responsible for licensing medical practitioners.”). 
 170. Tit. 32, § 13731(1)(B). 
 171. See Ouellette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D. Me. 2015). 
 172. Id. at 5–6, 9, 12. 
 173. Id. at 9. 
 174. Id. at 12. 
 175. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879, 882 (2008) (making a similar argument with respect to state climate change 
regulation). 
 176. Ouellette, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 8.  
 177. Id. at 10. Another reason is, of course, that this decision only reflects the opinion of 
one federal judge. 
 178. See id. at 5. 
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preemption arguments may face challenges in other FDA contexts in which it is less 
clear that Congress intended the federal government to dominate drug regulation.179  
2. The Zohydro Ban and Restrictions 
Unlike the Maine importation law, state efforts to regulate Zohydro reflect con-
cerns that the FDA’s requirements are not strict enough. Concerned that the FDA’s 
2013 approval of Zohydro, an opioid that lacked abuse-deterrent properties, would 
contribute to the opioid misuse epidemic, Massachusetts banned Zohydro in 2014.180 
Massachusetts’s Zohydro ban was framed as part of its regulation of the practice of 
medicine. Following the governor’s direction, the Department of Public Health pro-
hibited the prescribing, dispensing, or administering of Zohydro until it was refor-
mulated to be abuse deterrent.181 Because the ban covered healthcare providers’ pre-
scribing and dispensing decisions—rather than the drug manufacturer’s sale 
activities—the state argued that this ban was part of its traditional regulation of medi-
cal practice.182  
But, as with Maine’s importation law, framing the Zohydro ban as medical prac-
tice regulation was not sufficient to save it.183 After Massachusetts implemented its 
ban, Zogenix, Inc., Zohydro’s then-manufacturer,184 sought a preliminary injunction, 
arguing that, among other things, the ban was preempted by the FDCA.185 Judge Rya 
Zobel of the District of Massachusetts concluded that the ban obstructed “the FDA’s 
Congressionally-given charge” because if Massachusetts “were able to countermand 
the FDA’s [approval] determinations and substitute its own requirements, it would 
undermine the FDA’s ability to make drugs available to promote and protect the 
public health.”186 In other words, the judge relied on an obstacle preemption rationale 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. Cf. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616–17 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]ield pre-emption is itself suspect, at least as applied in the 
absence of a congressional command that a particular field be pre-empted.”); Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716–19 (1985) (holding that county 
ordinances governing blood plasma centers were not preempted under a field preemption 
theory). 
 180. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 15, 2014).  
 181. Id. The language of the ban prohibited the use of any extended-release drugs that 
lacked abuse-deterrent properties and contained hydrocodone as their only active ingredient. 
At the time of the ban, Zohydro was the only such drug on the market. Accordingly, this Ar-
ticle refers to the ban as a ban on Zohydro. 
 182. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Application for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief at 15–16, Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696. 
 183. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1. 
 184. In March 2015, Zogenix sold Zohydro to another drug company, Pernix Therapeutics. 
But for simplicity, this Article refers to Zogenix as the drug’s manufacturer and relevant plain-
tiff. News Release, Zogenix Announces Agreement of Sale of Zohydro(R) ER Business to 
Pernix for $100 Million at Closing Plus Potential Milestones of $283.5 Million, (Mar. 10, 
2015), http://ir.zogenix.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=220862&p=irol-newsArticle&id=2024400 [https:// 
perma.cc/2EMS-4HWN].  
 185. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2. 
 186. Id.   
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to enjoin the ban.187 Thus, as Judge Torresen did with Maine’s drug importation law, 
Judge Zobel looked to the underlying intent of the ban, and its practical effect, to 
assess the preemption question before her. 
The Zohydro story, however, did not end there. Massachusetts declined to appeal 
Judge Zobel’s decision to enjoin the ban, and instead, as Vermont had done, imposed 
restrictions on the use of Zohydro that fall short of a complete ban.188 Specifically, 
the Massachusetts medical board required healthcare providers to take certain steps 
before prescribing Zohydro, including thoroughly assessing the patient’s risk factors 
of drug abuse, entering into a “Pain Management Treatment Agreement” with the 
patient, and documenting that other pain treatments were inadequate.189 
Massachusetts also established requirements for pharmacies that handle Zohydro.190 
These requirements include that the drug be stored in a securely locked cabinet and 
dispensed in a child-proof container, that the pharmacist verify that the prescriber 
has documented that other pain treatments are inadequate, that the pharmacist pro-
vide a written warning to patients about the risks of abuse, and that the pharmacist 
check the patient’s medical history in the state-wide database for drugs of abuse.191 
Zogenix challenged these new regulations, arguing that they amount to a de facto 
ban on Zohydro.192 Although Judge Zobel explained that the preemption claim could 
succeed if the new regulations did, in fact, affect the availability of Zohydro, she 
declined to enjoin the new regulations.193  
Although Zogenix did not advance this argument, the state Zohydro restrictions 
may also be vulnerable to a different obstacle preemption challenge because the state 
regulations went beyond the federal restrictions on Zohdyro’s use imposed by the 
FDA.194 The FDA has required a “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS)” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. See, e.g., Valencia, supra note 12. 
 189. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07(25) (2015). Vermont has imposed similar requirements 
on prescribers, including that they assess the patient’s risks for drug abuse, enter into a 
Treatment Agreement with the patient, and document that Zohydro is required for the man-
agement of the patient’s pain. See Letter from Ronald J. Klein, Exec. Officer, Vt. Bd. of 
Pharmacy, & Linda Davidson, Exec. Dir., Vt. Bd. of Nursing, to Health Care Prescribers and 
Dispensers (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.sec.state.vt.us/media/474524/Zohydro-Memo-and 
-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK7K-JNCK].  
 190. 247 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.04(8) (2014). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Zogenix, Inc. v. Baker, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2015 WL 1206354, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 
17, 2015). 
 193. See id. at *4; Sharkey, supra note 21, at 1619–20. 
 194. Because Zohydro is a controlled substance, its use is also subject to restrictions under 
the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Under the CSA, Zohydro—like all painkillers 
with hydrocodone as an active ingredient—is subject to Schedule II controls, which include a 
prohibition on prescription refills and a requirement that prescriptions be written, rather than 
oral. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 829(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-198); Schedules of 
Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products from Schedule 
III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,662, 49,675 (Aug. 22, 2014) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 1308). The focus of this Article, however, is the intersection of state law with the FDA’s 
authority. Moreover, the CSA contains language indicating that Congress intended it to dis-
place state law only when “there is a positive conflict between [a] provision of [the CSA] and 
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for Zohydro (and other similar opioids).195 The FDA is authorized to require a REMS 
for a prescription drug when the agency determines that a risk-mitigation program is 
necessary to ensure that the drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.196 In short, through a 
REMS, the FDA can impose requirements on the drug’s manufacturer that go beyond 
providing warnings and other information in a drug’s labeling.197 These requirements 
may include, among other things, that a manufacturer ensure that practitioners who 
prescribe or dispense the drug have special training, that a drug is dispensed only in 
certain settings such as hospitals, or that certain test results are documented before a 
drug is dispensed.198  
Although medical practitioners ultimately carry out many of these REMS require-
ments, the requirements apply only to drug manufacturers.199 Thus, regardless of 
their content, the Massachusetts and Vermont restrictions on the use of Zohydro 
—which apply to medical practitioners—do not make it “impossible” for any party 
to comply with both state and federal requirements. Likewise, a field preemption 
argument is unlikely to be successful because of courts’ reluctance to conclude that 
Congress implicitly reserved the entire field of drug regulation for the federal gov-
ernment (absent an intersection with foreign commerce).200  
That the FDA has required a REMS for Zohydro, however, may provide a plau-
sible basis for challenging state Zohydro restrictions on obstacle preemption 
grounds. Through its REMS, the FDA requires that Zogenix make training available 
                                                                                                                 
 
. . . State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.” 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012); 
Noah, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 195. See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Extended-Release 
and Long-Acting (ER/LA) Opioid Analgesics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm?event=RemsDetails.page&REMS=17 
[https://perma.cc/U4UU-DC6A] (last updated Sept. 30, 2016). 
 196. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(a), (b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-255).  
 197. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bragg & Maya P. Florence, Life with a REMS: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 269 (2010); Evans, supra note 19, at 511–16; 
Kristen Underhill, Risk-Taking and Rulemaking: Addressing Risk Compensation Behavior 
Through FDA Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 377, 426–28 (2013). 
 198. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f)(3). Under the FDCA, REMS requirements apply to the 
person(s) who submit certain new drug or biological license applications for approval, or who 
hold certain approved applications. Id. § 355-1(a). Because these persons are generally the 
drug’s manufacturer, this Article describes the REMS requirements as applying to a drug’s 
manufacturer. 
 199. See Zettler, supra note 19, at 463. 
 200. See supra Part II.A.2. Additionally, mitigating the risks of drugs may be a field that, 
however it is defined, is one where courts conclude that state and federal regulation coexist. 
For example, before Congress authorized the FDA to require REMS in 2007, numerous states 
had established prescription drug monitoring programs for controlled substances, to collect 
data and deter abuse (and these programs continue in the present). Such programs could be 
characterized as risk mitigation programs—and indeed, the FDA can require a registry to col-
lect information about a drug as part of a REMS. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f). As the Supreme 
Court has explained, “[t]he case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress 
has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has 
nonetheless decided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] be-
tween them.’” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)). 
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to Zohydro prescribers, but declined to impose additional requirements, such as that 
pharmacies be certified to dispense the drug or only dispense the drug with certain 
documentation.201 That is, the FDA chose not to impose some of the requirements 
imposed by Vermont and Massachusetts—for example, that the inadequacy of other 
pain treatments be documented before Zohydro is dispensed.  
Generally, the federal government’s failure to act or impose a requirement does 
not create a strong case for preemption.202 But in this context, Congress has arguably 
required the FDA to do a complex balancing of numerous considerations, both in 
determining whether a REMS is necessary at all, and in determining what to include 
in a REMS when one is needed.203 To require a REMS, the agency must consider the 
risks and benefits of a drug, and determine that a REMS is “necessary to ensure that 
the benefits of the drug outweigh [its] risks.”204 If the FDA determines that a REMS 
is necessary, Congress expressly required that certain REMS elements be “commen-
surate with [a] specific serious risk” listed in the drug’s labeling, not be “unduly 
burdensome on patient access to the drug,” and “to the extent practicable . . . mini-
mize the burden on the healthcare delivery system.”205 Thus, a court might reasona-
bly conclude that state requirements additional to those in an FDA-required REMS 
pose an obstacle to the FDA’s responsibility to satisfy these Congressional objec-
tives, particularly if courts increasingly view federal regulatory choices as an effort 
to find the optimal balance between competing policy goals.206  
3. California’s Track and Trace Law 
Unlike the Massachusetts Zohydro ban and Maine’s drug importation law, 
California’s “track and trace” law provides an example of express preemption—and 
an example of a state that apparently wanted its law, which was more stringent than 
federal law, to be preempted by the FDCA. California enacted this law in 2004 to 
prevent counterfeit drugs and substandard drugs from reaching patients.207 To that 
end, the law required a “pedigree” for prescription drugs.208 A pedigree documents 
every “stop” a drug makes as it travels through the supply chain, from the point of 
manufacturing through its arrival at a pharmacy for dispensing to a patient.209 A pedi-
gree is intended to prevent counterfeit and other potentially substandard drugs from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), supra note 195; see 
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32 HAMLINE L. REV. 707, 719 (2009). 
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 207. See 2004 Cal. Stat. 6459; Lisa A. Daigle, ASHP Policy Analysis: Following Pharma-
ceutical Products Through the Supply Chain, AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACISTS 
2–3 (2012), https://www.ashp.org/DocLibrary/Advocacy/AnalysisPaper/Following-Pharmaceutical 
-Products.aspx [https://perma.cc/TW8H-T8YG]. 
 208. Daigle, supra note 207, at 3. 
 209. See id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE  § 4034 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) (repealed 
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entering the supply chain, and, if that fails, to enable regulators and industry to track 
such drugs and remove them from the supply chain—hence the name “track and 
trace.”210 The California requirements, similar to the Maine drug importation law and 
the Massachusetts Zohydro ban, were codified in the state laws regulating pharmacy 
practice and overseen by the state board of pharmacy.211  
When California enacted its law, the FDA had not established a federal track and 
trace system—and likely lacked the statutory authority to do so.212 Interestingly, 
however, California’s law contained a provision inviting federal preemption.213 The 
law stated that it would “become inoperative” “[u]pon the effective date of federal 
legislation or adoption of a federal regulation.”214 Additionally, any FDA “rule, 
standard, or . . . other action that [was] inconsistent with any provision of California 
law governing . . . a pedigree” would render that provision of California law “in-
operative.”215 This invitation for preemption was remarkably broad. For example, 
because any federal “action” would render conflicting California law inoperative, 
even voluntary federal standards may have replaced California’s standards, even 
though a court otherwise would almost certainly hold that nonbinding federal recom-
mendations do not preempt binding state law. 
Although California’s requirements never fully went into effect, they ultimately 
motivated federal action.216 In 2013, the federal Drug Quality and Security Act was 
enacted, which created a federal track and trace system similar to what would have 
been required by California law.217 The Drug Quality and Security Act also provides 
that “no State . . . may establish or continue in effect any requirements for tracing 
products through the distribution system . . . which are inconsistent with, more strin-
gent than, or in addition to, any [federal] requirements.”218 Consistent with the 
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and Environmental Law To Hold Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Authorized Distributors 
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 211. 2004 Cal. Stat. 6459.  
 212. At the time the laws were enacted, the FDCA required the FDA to establish “stand-
ards” for a track and trace system but did not authorize the FDA to take enforcement actions 
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Aleong, supra note 210, at 252–57. 
 213. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4034.1 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) (repealed 2015). 
 214. Id. at § 4034.1(a)(1). 
 215. Id. at § 4034(b)(1). 
 216. See Daigle, supra note 207, at 3. 
 217. Drug Quality and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587, 599–640 (2013). 
 218. Id. at sec. 205, § 585, 127 Stat. at 638. 
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express preemption provision in the Drug Quality and Security Act, and the 
invitation for preemption in California’s own law, California repealed its track and 
trace law after the federal law was enacted.219 
4. Medical Marijuana 
State medical marijuana laws offer one example of state laws for which there is a 
weaker case for FDA preemption. In 1996, California enacted the first “comprehen-
sive” medical marijuana law, and since then, twenty-eight states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, have followed suit.220 These state laws generally 
remove state criminal penalties for medical marijuana use, permit access to mari-
juana through home cultivation or dispensaries, and permit various forms of mari-
juana use, including smoking or vaporizing.221 The mechanisms through which state 
laws permit and regulate access to medical marijuana often resemble medical prac-
tice laws, including licensing requirements for marijuana cultivators, dispensers, and 
prescribers, and limits on the conditions for which patients may obtain medical ma-
rijuana. For example, a recently enacted state law, signed by the governor of Ohio in 
June 2016, authorizes licensing requirements for marijuana cultivators, processors, 
dispensers, and prescribers, requires registration of patients and caregivers, and 
specifies the twenty-one conditions for which marijuana may be prescribed, includ-
ing cancer, intractable pain, and multiple sclerosis.222 
Although medical marijuana laws are obviously focused on patients and medical 
care, one purpose of them also may be to eliminate the prohibition on recreational 
marijuana.223 And the intersection between state medical marijuana laws and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. 2014 Cal. Stat. 3601 sec. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 2015).  
 220. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 16. Four states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted laws permitting the recreational use of marijuana. Id. This Article 
focuses on medical, rather than recreational, marijuana laws as an example of state drug regu-
lation because they are more widespread. But marketing marijuana for recreational uses may 
also result in it falling within the FDA’s jurisdiction because the FDCA includes in its defini-
tion of “drugs” products that are “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” 
21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-255). A drug intended to provide a 
“high” is intended to affect the function of the body. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g); see also FDA, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BOTANICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY 2–3 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatory 
information/guidances/ucm458484.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X25-4QJX] (explaining the statu-
tory definition of a drug).  
 221. See, e.g., State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 16. Another seventeen states 
have enacted limited medical marijuana laws, which permit access only to marijuana with low 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content or only to cannabidiol, the ingredient thought to be the 
source of marijuana’s purported medical benefit. Id. 
 222. H.B. 523, 131st Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2016), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov
/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-HB-523 [https://perma.cc/EL7K-RXCQ] (click 
“View Current Version”). The law also permits the state medical board to add more conditions. 
 223. See, e.g., About Us, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/about [https://
perma.cc/5WV4-7RH2]. 
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federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) has been widely discussed.224 The CSA 
currently classifies marijuana as a “Schedule I” drug, the category for drugs with a 
high likelihood of addiction, no safe dose, and no “currently accepted” medical 
use.225 Accordingly, the CSA prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, dispensing, 
and possession of marijuana.226 Although the federal government cannot force states 
to enact laws that prohibit these activities,227 and has had a policy of not enforcing 
federal law against certain individuals distributing or using marijuana in compliance 
with state law,228 state laws that expressly permit marijuana manufacture, 
distribution, dispensing, or possession are clearly inconsistent with the CSA.229  
But medical marijuana laws also intersect with the FDA’s jurisdiction.230 Any 
substance that is “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease”—as medical marijuana is—meets the FDCA’s definition of a 
drug.231 Given the paucity of high-quality data supporting many medical uses of ma-
rijuana, marijuana is also likely a “new drug” that cannot be marketed for many of 
its intended uses without the FDA’s approval.232 In fact, the FDA has approved 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Le-
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L. REV. 689, 698 (2015); Kevin A. Sabet, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Rescheduling Won’t 
Solve Advocates’ Medical Marijuana Problem, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 81, 101 (2012).  
 231. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-255). 
 232. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 321(p), 355(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-255); Deepak 
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313 JAMA 2431 (2015); Kevin P. Hill, Medical Marijuana for Treatment of Chronic Pain 
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Penny F. Whiting, Robert F. Wolff, Sohan Deshpande, Marcello Di Nisio, Steven Duffy, 
Adrian V. Hernandez, Christiaan Keurentjes, Shona Lang, Kate Misso, Steve Ryder, Simone 
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Review and Meta-Analysis, 313 JAMA 2456 (2015). But see Richard J. Schrot & John R. 
Hubbard, Cannabinoids: Medical Implications, 48 ANNALS OF MED. 128, 128 (2016) (arguing 
2017] PHARMACEUTICAL FEDERALISM  879 
 
synthetic THC and THC analogue drugs, which suggests that the FDA understands 
marijuana to be a “new drug.”233 Accordingly, state medical marijuana laws represent 
an attempt to permit access to medicine outside of the FDA approval process. 
Because the FDA’s jurisdiction is limited to drugs that move in interstate com-
merce (including drugs with components that move in interstate commerce),234 medi-
cal marijuana laws could be written to avoid the FDA altogether by permitting only 
wholly intrastate production and sale of marijuana. There is historical precedent for 
such state laws. In the 1970s and 1980s, many states enacted laws that permitted the 
intrastate production and sale of laetrile.235 Laetrile is a compound derived from apri-
cot pits that was marketed as a cancer cure.236 Despite a lack of evidence supporting 
this use, healthcare providers and patients challenged the FDA’s restrictions on the 
sale of the unapproved drug.237 This challenge led to an unsuccessful lawsuit against 
the FDA, congressional hearings, and ultimately the state laws that permitted the 
intrastate sale of laetrile.238 However, although some marijuana products similarly 
might be produced, sold, and used wholly within a state such that they are outside 
the FDA’s jurisdiction, medical marijuana laws generally are not limited to such in-
trastate products.239 Thus medical marijuana laws pose the question of whether the 
FDCA preempts them.  
An FDA preemption challenge to medical marijuana laws is less likely to be suc-
cessful than the challenges to the Maine importation law and the Massachusetts 
Zohydro ban and restrictions. First, a court is unlikely to conclude that state medical 
marijuana laws are preempted by the FDCA on an impossibility theory.240 Marketing 
medical marijuana pursuant to a state law but without the approval of the FDA would 
violate federal law (assuming that the drug travels in interstate commerce),241 but 
nothing in the state medical marijuana laws compels a person to violate federal law 
by selling marijuana without FDA approval.242 A person could comply with both 
state and federal law by obtaining FDA approval to market marijuana before doing 
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 242. See, e.g., Sabet, supra note 230, at 101. 
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so.243 Moreover, to the extent state marijuana laws involve prescriber and dispenser 
licensing, or prescribing decisions, the laws would apply to parties—that is, medical 
practitioners—to whom FDA requirements generally do not directly apply.244 
A challenge to medical marijuana laws under an obstacle preemption theory 
would be a stronger case, but still may be unlikely to succeed.245 Some courts have 
been convinced by obstacle preemption arguments with respect to the CSA by, for 
example, concluding that state laws prohibiting employment discrimination against 
medical marijuana users are an obstacle to the execution of the objectives of the 
CSA.246 By permitting the sale of drugs for which there is little evidence of safety 
and effectiveness at least for some uses,247 state medical marijuana laws arguably 
“stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives” of the FDA’s congressionally mandated mission of ensuring the safety 
and effectiveness of drugs.248 And courts have echoed the idea that Congress in-
tended the FDA to be the gatekeeper for drugs both inside the preemption context 
—such as in the litigation challenging Maine’s drug importation law249—and outside 
the preemption context. For example, in United States v. Evers, a case involving al-
legedly illegal drug promotion, the Fifth Circuit noted that the FDA “was obviously 
intended to control the availability of drugs for prescribing by physicians.”250 More-
over, medical marijuana laws do not present a theoretical obstacle to the FDA’s mis-
sion. Evidence suggests that state medical marijuana laws are in fact utilized by a 
large group of patients—one group that researches controversial policy issues esti-
mates that over one million patients obtain medical marijuana under state laws.251  
This theory, however, has significant weaknesses, even if courts are increasingly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. Obtaining FDA approval for marijuana admittedly may be somewhat complicated be-
cause it is a “botanical,” that is, plant-based, drug. As the FDA has explained in guidance, if a 
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are preempted because the FDA wholly occupies the field of determining whether drugs are 
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Part II.B.2. 
 246. See, e.g., Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 166–67 (Or. 2006) 
(Kistler, J., concurring).  
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 249. See Ouellette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–11 (D. Me. 2015). 
 250. 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original).  
 251. Number of Legal Medical Marijuana Patients, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana 
.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=005889 [https://perma.cc/S48R-YUYD] (last 
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litigation. 
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inclined to rely on obstacle preemption to strike down state laws that disrupt the 
careful balancing that the federal government has struck with a particular policy.252 
In general, where state regulation has existed for decades, and Congress is well aware 
of that regulation, as is the case with medical marijuana, courts may be reluctant to 
rely on an obstacle preemption.253 Additionally, recent congressional attempts to fed-
erally legalize marijuana that have largely ignored the FDA’s jurisdiction provide 
some evidence that Congress does not intend the FDA to occupy the field of mari-
juana regulation.254 Moreover, the evidence that the FDA has done a careful balanc-
ing of competing federal goals with respect to marijuana is weaker than it is for 
Zohydro. Unlike with Zohydro, where there is evidence that the FDA carefully con-
sidered the safety and effectiveness (and potential for abuse) of Zohydro in both its 
approval decision and its decision to require a REMS,255 there is no publicly available 
documentation that the FDA has considered the use of marijuana for the full range 
to indications for which states have authorized its use, and rejected those uses.256 In 
sum, while there are colorable arguments that the FDCA preempts medical marijuana 
laws, the chances of success of such a challenge may be remote. 
5. “Right To Try” Laws 
State “right to try” laws provide another example of state drug laws intended to 
provide access to drugs outside of the FDA process, for which there is a weaker case 
for FDA preemption. “Right to try” laws are intended to provide terminally and se-
riously ill patients easy access to unapproved drugs (and devices) for treatment pur-
poses, outside of clinical trials.257 The term for such treatment use in the FDA’s reg-
ulations is “expanded access.”258 FDA regulations specify a process for requesting 
expanded access, and the agency authorizes approximately ninety-nine percent of 
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patients’ requests.259 But advocacy groups and patients have criticized the FDA pro-
cess for being slow and burdensome.260 Although there is good reason to think such 
criticisms of the FDA are not deserved,261 since 2014, over thirty states have enacted 
“right to try” laws, and additional states are considering proposed legislation.262  
“Right to try” laws are based on model legislation drafted by the Goldwater 
Institute, an organization that advocates for a “constitutionally limited govern-
ment.”263 The laws permit access to experimental drugs that have successfully com-
pleted phase 1 trials—small, first-in-human studies intended to show only that a drug 
is safe enough for further study.264 A few additional requirements generally must be 
met, including that the patient’s physician documents the patient’s illness and that 
the patient has considered all approved treatment options, and that the patient has 
provided informed consent.265 The laws also typically provide that a state medical 
board cannot discipline a physician solely for recommending an unapproved drug 
under these laws and stipulate both that companies may charge for the unapproved 
drugs and insurers are not required to cover them.266  
These “right to try” laws provide significantly fewer safeguards for patients than 
the FDA’s expanded access regulations do.267 For example, under the FDA’s regula-
tions, the patient must go beyond merely considering approved treatment options and 
demonstrate that he or she lacks “comparable or satisfactory” approved treatment 
options.268 As another example, in addition to requiring that patients provide in-
formed consent, the FDA requires that an independent ethics review committee 
—known as an institutional review board (IRB)—reviews and approves the 
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/LJ9X-9VUH]. 
 264. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2016). 
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[https://perma.cc/52KY-25SK].   
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 268. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2016).  
2017] PHARMACEUTICAL FEDERALISM  883 
 
expanded access program before the patient receives the experimental drug.269 The 
FDA also requires some evidence to support the treatment use of the unapproved 
drug, albeit far short of the level of evidence required for drug approval.270 
“Right to try” laws, therefore, offer the opportunity to consider the preemptive 
effects of the FDA’s authority in another context in which states have established 
requirements less stringent than the FDA’s. “Right to try” advocates assert that any 
preemption challenge to the laws would fail because, under the Tenth Amendment, 
“federal regulations that violate constitutional liberties can never trump state 
laws.”271 They argue that “right to try” laws “preserve constitutionally protected 
rights, such as a person’s right to life and medical self-preservation.”272 Although 
patients often have very sympathetic claims for access to unapproved therapies (and 
understandable reasons for wanting access),273 courts have declined to recognize 
such access as a constitutionally protected right.274 Accordingly, “right to try” laws 
are not likely to survive preemption challenges on the ground that they protect a 
constitutional right.275 
Yet “right to try” advocates may not be wrong that preemption challenges to the 
laws are likely to fail. Nothing in the state laws makes it impossible for a drug manu-
facturer to comply with the FDA’s expanded access regulations because the FDA’s 
requirements are more stringent.276 As long as the FDA has authorized the treatment 
use of the unapproved drug under its regulations (and the manufacturer complies 
with the other requirements in FDA regulations), a drug manufacturer would comply 
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for bureaucratic failure.”). 
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695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Shah & Zettler, supra note 35, at 140–51. 
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with both federal and state law if it chose to supply its unapproved drug to a patient 
in one of the “right to try” states.277  
As in the medical marijuana context, an obstacle preemption challenge to “right 
to try” laws is a closer call but may face some difficulties.278 In support of such a 
challenge, there is considerable evidence that Congress intended the FDA to deter-
mine when access to drugs is appropriate. In section 561 of the FDCA, Congress 
explicitly authorized the FDA to establish an expanded access program and required 
the FDA to balance various considerations when reviewing patients’ access requests, 
including the data supporting the use of the unapproved drug and whether expanded 
access to the unapproved drug will interfere with its approval process.279 And there 
is evidence—in the form of detailed regulations—that the FDA has in fact carefully 
considered the complex ethical and scientific issues associated with expanded access 
to establish a process that the agency believes strikes the right balance.280 To the 
extent “right to try” laws deviate from the FDA process, they, therefore, could be 
viewed as undermining the objectives of the federal program.   
But unlike medical marijuana, there is no convincing evidence that any patients 
have received unapproved drugs pursuant to state laws outside the FDA’s process.281 
Without such evidence, it may be difficult to argue that these state laws thwart the 
FDA’s expanded access policy—to the extent courts conclude that a party must 
demonstrate actual frustration of federal objectives to succeed on an obstacle 
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preemption theory. Moreover, certain aspects of state “right to try” laws either may 
be consistent with FDA oversight, such as provisions noting that drug manufacturers 
are not required to provide unapproved drugs to patients and may charge patients for 
the cost of the drug, or may not directly intersect with FDA oversight, such as provi-
sions eliminating drug manufacturers’ liability for providing access or stating that 
insurers are not required to cover unapproved drugs.282 As with marijuana, therefore, 
it is unclear that an obstacle preemption challenge to “right to try” laws would 
succeed.  
C. Preempting Medical Practice Regulation 
The above Part demonstrates that there are plausible arguments that FDA over-
sight preempts much divergent state regulation—but determining whether FDA 
oversight preempts state drug regulation is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not yield 
a categorical answer. This, however, is not to say that examining recent drug regula-
tion provides no new insights into the scope of the FDA’s authority. Rather, the 
analysis suggests that in one area—medical practice regulation—the preemptive 
reach of the FDA’s authority may be more extensive than previously thought.  
Conventional wisdom in health law and policy holds that states regulate the prac-
tice of medicine, while the federal government—specifically the FDA—regulates 
drugs.283 This adage has been cited by lawmakers, courts, and the FDA itself when 
discussing the limits on the agency’s jurisdiction.284 For example, in a 1972 proposed 
rule, the FDA explained “it is clear that Congress did not intend the [FDA] to regulate 
. . . the practice of medicine.”285 As a more recent example, in the litigation about its 
drug importation law, Maine argued that the regulation of medical practice—in that 
case, requirements for pharmacy licensing—is “an area traditionally reserved for the 
states,” and Judge Torresen did not dispute that proposition.286  
The history of drug and medical practice regulation explained in Part I raises ques-
tions about whether this conventional wisdom ever accurately described the intersec-
tion (or lack thereof) of state and federal regulation. State drug regulation—often 
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framed as medical practice regulation—dates back to the colonies and continues to-
day in various forms, including state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts that mimic fed-
eral law. Likewise, the federal government has long regulated medical practice. For 
example, during the prohibition era in the early twentieth century, federal law limited 
the amount of liquor that physicians could prescribe.287 Nevertheless, the idea that 
the practice-products distinction serves as the dividing line between state and federal 
regulation persists.288  
However, a preemption analysis of recent state drug laws and regulations under-
scores that the distinction between regulating medical practice and medical products 
is nebulous. If the FDA has no role in directly or indirectly regulating medical prac-
tice, state medical practice laws and regulations should not be preempted by the 
FDA’s authority. But as litigation over the Maine drug importation law and the 
Massachusetts Zohydro ban show most clearly, the FDA’s preemptive reach can ex-
tend into medical practice regulation in certain circumstances.289  
The Maine drug importation law exempted foreign pharmacies from Maine’s li-
censing requirements but did not purport to “approve” foreign drugs.290 The 
Massachusetts ban prohibited medical practitioners from prescribing and dispensing 
Zohydro, but did not prohibit the drug manufacturer from selling Zohydro in Massa-
chusetts.291 Yet Judges Torresen and Zobel concluded that FDA oversight preempted 
both state efforts, implicitly collapsing the distinction between regulating medical 
practice and regulating medical products to reach those conclusions.292 Both judges 
acknowledged the long history of state medical practice regulation pursuant to states’ 
police powers, and that the state laws and regulations at issue purported to continue 
in this tradition.293 Nevertheless they looked beyond that framing to the underlying 
intent of the regulatory efforts, concluding that they were intended to challenge par-
ticular aspects of the FDA’s scheme.294 They did so because, as Judge Torresen 
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explained, “[w]hen undertaking preemption analysis, courts . . . evaluate whether the 
aim of the state law is to affect an area of federal regulation or interest.”295  
Indeed, examining the underlying intent of the state regulation seems to be the 
appropriate legal approach. Importantly, there is no constitutional bar on FDA regu-
lation of medical practice.296 Because there is no constitutional significance to a state 
applying its oversight to medical practitioners rather than to drug manufacturers or 
the drugs themselves, in these preemption cases, courts are simply faced with the 
question of whether Congress intended FDA oversight to displace state regulation.297 
And as the Supreme Court has explained, “the words of a statute must be read in 
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”298 Con-
sistent with this idea, in considering preemption questions, courts are right to con-
sider states’ intent to regulate drugs, even when the requirements of a state statute or 
regulation technically apply only to medical practitioners.  
Even with courts considering the underlying purpose of state regulation, however, 
states may be able to avoid impossibility challenges by applying their requirements 
to medical practitioners—whom the FDA generally does not directly regulate. As an 
example, because the terms of the Massachusetts ban on Zohydro prohibited practi-
tioners from prescribing and dispensing—and FDA requirements do not directly ap-
ply to practitioners—arguably, it was not impossible for any particular party to com-
ply with both state and federal law.299 That is, under the ban it would have been legal 
for Zohydro’s manufacturer to sell its drug within Massachusetts; there, however, 
would have been no buyers, because it would not have been legal for medical prac-
titioners to prescribe or dispense the drug. Thus, obstacle (and perhaps even field) 
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preemption may have an important role to play if such preemption challenges to state 
medical practice regulation are to be successful. But, at the very least, challenges 
asserting that state oversight is preempted by FDA regulation should not fail solely 
because a state action is framed as medical practice regulation.  
III. BEYOND PREEMPTION 
Beyond providing insights into the preemptive reach of the FDA’s authority, ex-
amining recent state interest in drug regulation may also inform our general under-
standing of both the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and the relationship between the 
FDA and the states. This Part explores two such lessons. First, this Part argues that 
the nebulousness of the practice-products binary revealed by recent state drug regu-
lation may have ramifications for debates about the confines of the FDA’s authority 
to regulate innovative technologies such as regenerative medicine and genetic test-
ing. Second, this Part considers the relationship between the FDA and the states, by 
beginning to explore why states might choose to spend their limited resources enact-
ing and defending drug regulation despite the specter of preemption litigation and 
the existing (and extensive) federal regulatory scheme. One possibility that emerges 
is that state drug regulation is an effective means to influence federal policy. 
A. Blurring the Practice-Products Distinction  
The blurriness of the practice-products distinction revealed by recent state drug 
regulation may have significance for debates about the proper scope of the FDA’s 
jurisdiction outside the preemption context—because these debates often involve 
questions about where to draw the line between medical practice and medical prod-
ucts oversight.300 And this line drawing may be particularly difficult when the FDA 
is faced with questions about whether, and how, to regulate new medical technolo-
gies that may not fit comfortably within the agency’s existing framework.301 Two 
examples—regenerative medicine and genetic testing—highlight the challenges of 
relying on the practice-products binary to determine the boundaries of the FDA’s 
jurisdiction. 
1. Regenerative Medicine 
Regenerative medicine offers one example of a medical technology in which the 
practice-products distinction has come into play. Therapies involving stem cell 
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transplantation are one area of regenerative medicine widely believed to hold great 
promise for treating myriad serious or life-threatening illnesses—albeit a promise 
that has yet to be realized for most conditions.302 Nevertheless, clinics offering 
autologous stem cell therapies for a range of conditions, including joint problems, 
asthma, autism, muscular dystrophy, and Alzheimer’s disease, have proliferated in 
the United States.303 In part because autologous stem cell therapies involve the 
transplantation of stem cells that are derived from the patient’s own tissue, some 
clinics, medical practitioners, and commentators have argued that these therapies are 
surgical procedures that are part of the practice of medicine and outside the FDA’s 
purview.304 
In at least one case, however, courts were unconvinced by this logic. In 2010, the 
FDA sought to enjoin three Colorado physicians and their company Regenerative 
Sciences, LLC from giving patients an autologous stem cell therapy, on the ground 
that it was a drug that violated the FDA’s requirements.305 The specific treatment 
involved removing the patient’s own bone marrow, isolating stems cells from that 
bone marrow, processing those stems cells, and then reimplanting the mixture back 
into the same patient.306 In the subsequent litigation, United States v. Regenerative 
Sciences, the physicians asserted that the FDA lacked authority over their stem cell 
treatment because it was a procedure that fell within Colorado’s definition of medical 
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practice and “the [FDA] was not intended to infringe on states’ traditional role in 
regulating the practice of medicine.”307 This argument did not persuade the D.C. 
Circuit in part because the court concluded that the stem cell therapy was a product, 
rather than a procedure.308 The court also expressed skepticism about the practice-
products distinction.309 It dismissed the physicians’ practice of medicine argument 
as a “syllogism,” concluding that the scope of the FDA’s authority cannot depend 
“on state-by-state definitions of the ‘practice of medicine’” and its “breadth . . . and 
applicability to doctors” is evident.310  
Nevertheless, some providers of autologous stem cell therapies continue to rely 
on the practice-products distinction to assert that they are not subject to FDA over-
sight.311 Indeed, this argument resurfaced at a public meeting that the FDA held to 
obtain input on its policies related to the regulation of cells and cellular products.312 
But, consistent with Regenerative Sciences and a preemption analysis of recent state 
drug regulation, relying on the practice-products distinction may not be particularly 
useful for identifying the borders of the FDA’s jurisdiction.313 
2. Genetic Testing 
Genetic testing offers a second example of an innovative technology for which 
FDA oversight implicates the practice-products distinction.314 Many (though not all) 
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genetic tests fall within a category known as “laboratory developed tests” (LDTs).315 
LDTs are in vitro diagnostic tests that are designed, manufactured, and used within 
a single laboratory.316 This category includes tests of varying complexity, from sim-
ple tests like those measuring sodium levels to more complicated tests like many 
genetic tests.317  
Although, according to the FDA, various requirements of the FDCA (including 
premarket review) apply to LDTs, for decades the FDA has declined to enforce these 
requirements for policy reasons.318 Because of changes to the LDT industry and test-
ing technology, in 2014 the FDA proposed phasing in enforcement of applicable 
regulatory requirements for “high and moderate risk” LDTs, including many genetic 
tests.319 This proposal was controversial, and various stakeholders and commentators 
criticized it on numerous legal and policy grounds.320  
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ting Regulation Right 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2258, 2258 (2015). Direct-to-consumer genetic 
tests, such as those famously offered by 23andMe, do not fall within the FDA’s LDT policies. 
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Although the agency does not currently plan to move forward with finalizing the 
proposed policy on LDTs until there is an opportunity for further public discussion 
and, possibly, congressional action,321 it is worth noting that one argument against 
the proposed policy that some laboratory stakeholders advanced was that LDTs are 
outside the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction because LDTs are services provided as 
part of the practice of medicine, rather than medical products.322 A challenge to the 
FDA’s authority over LDTs based solely on this argument, however, seems unlikely 
to succeed.323 As in the regenerative medicine and preemption contexts, in which 
courts have seemed willing to explicitly or implicitly dismiss the practice-products 
distinction, the line between practice and products oversight for LDTs may simply 
be too unclear to be useful. 
This is not to say that the FDA has the authority to regulate all aspects of medical 
practice (or to regulate all aspects of regenerative medicine and genetic testing). And 
to be clear, this Article does not attempt to determine in what circumstances the FDA 
possesses or lacks the authority to regulate LDTs and regenerative medicine. Rather, 
this Article posits that relying on the practice-products distinction may not be partic-
ularly helpful for answering these jurisdictional questions because the line between 
practice and products oversight can be quite unclear. Whether a particular technology 
is within the FDA’s jurisdiction simply depends on the relevant language of the 
FDA’s enabling statutes324—and if the statute authorizes the FDA to take a particular 
regulatory action, it can do so, even if that action affects or regulates medical 
practice.  
B. Beginning To Explore the Reasons for State Regulation  
In addition to informing debates about the proper scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction 
over new technologies, recent state interest in drug regulation that challenges FDA 
oversight raises a question about why this state interest has emerged, particularly 
given the possibility of preemption litigation. This Part first argues that this question 
about the reasons for state interest is heightened by the mixed practical impact of 
state regulation. It then begins to explore one reason that states may be interested in 
drug regulation that challenges FDA oversight—it may be an effective strategy to 
influence federal policy, even when a particular state action has limited legal or prac-
tical impact. 
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1. The Mixed Practical Effect of State Regulation  
Preemption is not the only reason that state drug regulation may be without sig-
nificant effect. State regulation that establishes a scheme more permissive than the 
FDA’s does not exempt drug manufacturers from federal requirements.325 For exam-
ple, marketing marijuana for conditions for which state governments have given their 
approval does not confer approval of such drugs under federal law.326 Likewise, drug 
companies would violate the FDA’s expanded access requirements if they choose to 
provide patients their unapproved drugs pursuant to a “right to try” law but without 
the FDA’s authorization.327 That is, the very argument that would render an impos-
sibility preemption challenge unsuccessful—that compliance with both state and fed-
eral requirements is possible—limits the legal impact of these laws. 
That federal requirements remain intact means that the practical effect of some 
state regulation may turn on whether there are incentives for the drug industry to take 
advantage of the state policies that diverge from federal law. Mainstream pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology companies are immensely profitable businesses that are 
designed around the FDA’s role as the gatekeeper and regulator of drugs. The per-
ception within the drug industry is that failing to cooperate with the FDA, or violating 
its requirements and policies, is costly.328 Therefore, without significant financial in-
centives or a publicly announced federal enforcement discretion policy, much of the 
drug industry may not be likely to risk violating the FDA’s requirements pursuant to 
an untested state law. 
The dramatically different practical impacts of the equivalently widespread state 
medical marijuana and “right to try” laws demonstrate the importance of industry 
incentives. Despite the continued prohibition on marijuana under the federal CSA 
and FDCA,329 state medical marijuana laws have created a robust, openly conducted 
marijuana market. One organization estimates that over one million patients have 
obtained medical marijuana consistent with state laws.330 And in 2014, retailers sold 
$386 million of medical marijuana (and another $313 million of recreational mari-
juana) in Colorado alone.331  
One reason for this vigorous, but federally illegal, marijuana market is almost 
certainly that the federal government announced that it would not pursue prosecution 
                                                                                                                 
 
 325. Other reasons might also include dormant commerce clause and substantive due pro-
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in many circumstances in which marijuana is sold in compliance with state law.332 
Congress subsequently gave teeth to this enforcement discretion policy through a 
rider in the omnibus appropriations bill that prohibited the U.S. Department of Justice 
from using funds on actions that would prevent states from implementing their med-
ical marijuana laws.333 But medical marijuana laws were also utilized before this en-
forcement discretion policy was in place.334 Another reason that state laws have cre-
ated a prospering marijuana market despite federal prohibitions may be that 
marijuana sellers are outside of the mainstream pharmaceutical industry.335 Without 
other products subject to FDA oversight or a business model designed around FDA 
approval and regulation, marijuana sellers may not have the same aversion to by-
passing the FDA as the traditional drug industry does. For example, although current 
federal policy suggests that the FDA is unlikely to enforce violations of its require-
ments that comply with state laws,336 mainstream drug companies might nevertheless 
wish to seek approval for any marijuana products because insurers often consider 
FDA approval when making coverage decisions.337  
Yet unlike the substantial market created by state medical marijuana laws, there 
is no convincing evidence that any patients have received an unapproved drug pur-
suant to a “right to try” law (and outside of the FDA’s expanded access program).338 
“Right to try” laws may have limited impact because the laws are new compared 
with medical marijuana laws, because they do not require drug companies to provide 
unapproved drugs to terminally ill patients, and because the laws do not address 
many valid industry concerns regarding the complicated practical and ethical ques-
tions that expanded access raises.339 But another reason might be that the mainstream 
drug industry has little incentive to risk a federal enforcement action by circumvent-
ing the FDA expanded access process. Indeed, the industry does not appear interested 
in providing unapproved drugs laws pursuant to “right to try” laws.340 For example, 
the primary trade organizations for brand-name drug manufacturers, the 
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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) and the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), have publicly expressed reservations 
about “right to try” laws.341 Neuralstem, Inc., is one of the few, if not the only com-
pany, to have publicly indicated interest in providing unapproved drugs under these 
state laws.342  
In sum, the “right to try” and medical marijuana laws demonstrate that preemption 
is not the only reason that state drug laws and regulations may have a limited impact. 
Together, these examples suggest that the practical effect of certain state regulation 
that is more permissive than federal law will be limited when the pharmaceutical 
industry is the major industry involved, and the industry generally lacks incentives 
to risk violating FDA requirements by testing the legality of the more permissive 
state programs. 
2. Influencing Federal Policy 
The uncertain practical impact of some state drug regulation, combined with the 
possibility that courts will conclude that the FDA’s extensive oversight preempts 
state regulation, raises the question of why states use their limited resources to enact 
and defend drug laws. One possibility is that states find regulation to be a useful tool 
for influencing federal policy.343 
The federal government itself, as well as commentators, have recognized that 
states ought to have a voice in federal policy.344 Indeed, administrative agencies have 
been directed to provide states the opportunity to participate in agency decision mak-
ing.345 The FDA’s own policy is that “[f]ederal, state, and local cooperation shall be 
fostered whenever possible,”346 and it established an “Office of Partnerships” to fa-
cilitate that goal.347  
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In addition to formal pathways for federal-state cooperation, state officials can 
participate in or comment on any public FDA proceeding, including proposed regu-
lations, guidance documents, and public meetings (just as any member of the public 
can). For example, before approving Zohydro, the FDA sought input on the drug’s 
safety and efficacy at a public advisory committee meeting.348 Although no state of-
ficials spoke at the meeting, they could have chosen to voice their concerns then.349  
Despite these avenues for states to communicate their concerns to the FDA, states 
may have logical reasons for enacting divergent drug regulation instead of, or in ad-
dition to, communicating with the FDA through existing channels. States are un-
doubtedly confronted with public health problems associated with FDA-regulated 
drugs. With Zohydro, for example, states bear many of the costs of prescription drug 
abuse, and state policies have had some success in decreasing abuse.350 Accordingly, 
state officials may rightfully have strong views about how best to prevent and address 
drug abuse. More cynically, because public opinion of the federal government is 
low,351 the political climate may be ripe for state lawmakers to reclaim territory 
within the health-and-safety sphere traditionally subject to the states’ police pow-
ers.352 State politicians may have much to gain politically—and little to lose—by 
inserting themselves into areas typically considered the domain of the federal gov-
ernment, like drug regulation, particularly when those areas touch on politically 
charged issues such as prescription drug abuse and marijuana. This political climate 
may also lead advocacy organizations to lobby for legal change at the state, rather 
than federal, level.353 
Moreover, federal agencies have a “dismal track record” in considering states’ 
input.354 Commentators have expressed concern that federal agencies—which, today, 
are the federal entities that often make “[c]ritical decisions about the actual scope of 
state powers and autonomy”355—are not adequately protecting state regulatory 
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interests.356 To remedy this problem, scholars have proposed mechanisms through 
which states could negotiate with agencies during decision-making processes, or 
through which Congress, the executive, or the courts might force agencies to take 
state interests into account.357  
Recent state drug laws and regulations—regardless of their practical impact on 
the drug market, or their legal effect—might be another way for the states, them-
selves, to force the FDA (or Congress) to account for their interests. One reason that 
state laws and regulations might influence federal policy, or industry support for fed-
eral policy change, is that they garner significant media attention. For example, the 
ban and restrictions on Zohydro in just two states elicited far more media coverage 
than did a letter from twenty-eight state attorneys general to the FDA requesting that 
it reconsider Zohydro’s approval.358  
And the Zohydro ban may have achieved Massachusetts’s desired policy out-
come—even though the ban was enjoined.359 In January 2015, the FDA approved a 
version of Zohydro that includes abuse-deterrent properties, which was a primary 
goal of Massachusetts’s initial ban.360 As additional examples, in the wake of the 
Zohydro ban and restrictions, Congress has considered several bills that, if enacted, 
would make it more difficult for the FDA to approve new opioids that lack abuse-
deterrent properties going forward;361 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
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released new guidelines on opioid prescribing intended to combat opioid misuses and 
overdoses;362 and the FDA requested a report from a National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee to identify actions that the agency 
could take to better address the opioid misuse epidemic.363 
Similarly, although Maine’s drug importation law was struck down, it too has 
received congressional and media attention. For example, after Maine enacted its 
drug importation law, congressional bills were introduced in 2013, 2015, and 2017 
that would allow U.S. patients to purchase cheaper, foreign drugs from certain coun-
tries.364 And following Judge Torresen’s decision invalidating Maine’s law, a 
spokesperson for one bill’s sponsor, Senator John McCain, said “[t]his decision high-
lights the importance that Congress act to change federal law.”365  
Likewise, although “right to try” laws have had no practical effect on the drug 
market,366 they have received significant media attention, and Congress has taken 
note. In July 2015, May 2016, and January 2017, lawmakers introduced a federal 
“right to try” bill, which would prevent the FDA from enforcing its expanded access 
requirements on companies that provide unapproved drugs pursuant to a state “right 
to try” law.367 Additionally, the FDA recently has taken steps to clarify and 
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streamline its expanded access process.368 After states began to enact these laws, the 
FDA simplified its application for the most-frequently-used expanded access 
program, and the agency issued a final version of its guidance document on expanded 
access.369 The agency is also now developing an “expanded access navigator,” to 
serve as a resource for interested patients and medical practitioners.370 
State marijuana laws also appear to have instigated change to federal policy. In 
2013, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum explaining that it does not 
intend to prosecute certain marijuana activities that violate federal CSA but are per-
missible under state law.371 Although the memorandum is not binding on the federal 
government, such enforcement discretion policies are a well-known means through 
which the federal government can accomplish its policy goals more quickly than 
statutory change occurs.372 In addition to this change to federal policy, as with 
Zohydro, drug importation, and “right to try” laws, Congress has recently considered 
proposals to change federal law to legalize medical marijuana use—and, as previ-
ously noted, included a rider in the omnibus appropriations bill that prohibits the 
Department of Justice from using funds to prevent states from implementing their 
medical marijuana laws.373  
While the previous examples involve proposed legislative change (or limits on 
how the federal government may use its funding), California’s track and trace law 
arguably realized change to federal law. Although California’s track and trace re-
quirements were never fully implemented, in 2013 Congress authorized the FDA to 
establish a federal track and trace system similar to the one required under California 
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law.374 For many years preceding the 2013 federal law (and the 2015 effective date 
of California’s requirements), there was scant industry support for a federally re-
quired system, likely because implementing a track and trace system is very expen-
sive, and proposals for a federal track and trace system were unsuccessful.375 But 
California, which is a large market for drugs, has been credited with motivating in-
dustry to support for a federal system.376 When California enacted its own track and 
trace requirements, it created the prospect of varied, and possibly stricter, state re-
quirements, and also provided a clear way for industry to avoid that outcome 
—through the law’s express invitation for federal preemption. The California law, 
thus, suggests a way for states to use invitations for federal preemption to create 
industry support for federal policy change.  
In sum, taken together, these examples of recent state efforts to regulate drugs 
suggest that state regulation may be an effective strategy for affecting federal law 
and policy, at least in certain instances. And even those state laws and regulations 
that are preempted, or have little practical impact on the pharmaceutical market, may 
be influential.  
CONCLUSION 
There is growing state interest in regulating drugs that are subject to federal over-
sight by the FDA. Although states have a long history of drug regulation, states tra-
ditionally complemented or copied FDA regulation. Recent state efforts, however, 
diverge from the FDA’s regulatory schemes. These efforts, thus, offer the oppor-
tunity to consider the intersection of state and federal pharmaceutical regulation in a 
new light. Analyzing five examples of state regulation demonstrates that the preemp-
tive effects of the FDA’s authority may extend into state regulation of medical prac-
tice in some circumstances—and this blurriness of the practice-products distinction 
has ramifications for debates about the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction outside the 
preemption context as well. But even when state regulation is preempted or otherwise 
fails to change the practices of the drug industry, such regulation may be a useful 
strategy for states to influence policy change at the federal level, at least in some 
instances. 
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